fortify/internal/app/seal.go
Ophestra Umiker 7df9d8d01d
system: move sd_booted implementation to os abstraction
This implements lazy loading of the systemd marker (they are not accessed in init and shim) and ensures consistent behaviour when running with a stub.

Signed-off-by: Ophestra Umiker <cat@ophivana.moe>
2024-10-27 12:09:34 +09:00

280 lines
7.0 KiB
Go

package app
import (
"errors"
"io/fs"
"os/user"
"path"
"strconv"
"git.ophivana.moe/security/fortify/dbus"
"git.ophivana.moe/security/fortify/internal"
"git.ophivana.moe/security/fortify/internal/fmsg"
"git.ophivana.moe/security/fortify/internal/shim"
"git.ophivana.moe/security/fortify/internal/state"
"git.ophivana.moe/security/fortify/internal/system"
)
const (
LaunchMethodSudo uint8 = iota
LaunchMethodMachineCtl
)
var method = [...]string{
LaunchMethodSudo: "sudo",
LaunchMethodMachineCtl: "systemd",
}
var (
ErrConfig = errors.New("no configuration to seal")
ErrUser = errors.New("unknown user")
ErrLaunch = errors.New("invalid launch method")
ErrSudo = errors.New("sudo not available")
ErrSystemd = errors.New("systemd not available")
ErrMachineCtl = errors.New("machinectl not available")
)
// appSeal seals the application with child-related information
type appSeal struct {
// app unique ID string representation
id string
// wayland mediation, disabled if nil
wl *shim.Wayland
// freedesktop application ID
fid string
// argv to start process with in the final confined environment
command []string
// persistent process state store
store state.Store
// uint8 representation of launch method sealed from config
launchOption uint8
// process-specific share directory path
share string
// process-specific share directory path local to XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
shareLocal string
// path to launcher program
toolPath string
// pass-through enablement tracking from config
et system.Enablements
// prevents sharing from happening twice
shared bool
// seal system-level component
sys *appSealSys
internal.Paths
// protected by upstream mutex
}
// Seal seals the app launch context
func (a *app) Seal(config *Config) error {
a.lock.Lock()
defer a.lock.Unlock()
if a.seal != nil {
panic("app sealed twice")
}
if config == nil {
return fmsg.WrapError(ErrConfig,
"attempted to seal app with nil config")
}
// create seal
seal := new(appSeal)
// fetch system constants
seal.Paths = a.os.Paths()
// pass through config values
seal.id = a.id.String()
seal.fid = config.ID
seal.command = config.Command
// parses launch method text and looks up tool path
switch config.Method {
case method[LaunchMethodSudo]:
seal.launchOption = LaunchMethodSudo
if sudoPath, err := a.os.LookPath("sudo"); err != nil {
return fmsg.WrapError(ErrSudo,
"sudo not found")
} else {
seal.toolPath = sudoPath
}
case method[LaunchMethodMachineCtl]:
seal.launchOption = LaunchMethodMachineCtl
if !a.os.SdBooted() {
return fmsg.WrapError(ErrSystemd,
"system has not been booted with systemd as init system")
}
if machineCtlPath, err := a.os.LookPath("machinectl"); err != nil {
return fmsg.WrapError(ErrMachineCtl,
"machinectl not found")
} else {
seal.toolPath = machineCtlPath
}
default:
return fmsg.WrapError(ErrLaunch,
"invalid launch method")
}
// create seal system component
seal.sys = new(appSealSys)
// look up fortify executable path
if p, err := a.os.Executable(); err != nil {
return fmsg.WrapErrorSuffix(err, "cannot look up fortify executable path:")
} else {
seal.sys.executable = p
}
// look up user from system
if u, err := a.os.Lookup(config.User); err != nil {
if errors.As(err, new(user.UnknownUserError)) {
return fmsg.WrapError(ErrUser, "unknown user", config.User)
} else {
// unreachable
panic(err)
}
} else {
seal.sys.user = u
seal.sys.runtime = path.Join("/run/user", u.Uid)
}
// map sandbox config to bwrap
if config.Confinement.Sandbox == nil {
fmsg.VPrintln("sandbox configuration not supplied, PROCEED WITH CAUTION")
// permissive defaults
conf := &SandboxConfig{
UserNS: true,
Net: true,
NoNewSession: true,
}
// bind entries in /
if d, err := a.os.ReadDir("/"); err != nil {
return err
} else {
b := make([]*FilesystemConfig, 0, len(d))
for _, ent := range d {
p := "/" + ent.Name()
switch p {
case "/proc":
case "/dev":
case "/run":
case "/tmp":
case "/mnt":
case "/etc":
b = append(b, &FilesystemConfig{Src: p, Dst: "/dev/fortify/etc", Write: false, Must: true})
default:
b = append(b, &FilesystemConfig{Src: p, Write: true, Must: true})
}
}
conf.Filesystem = append(conf.Filesystem, b...)
}
// bind entries in /run
if d, err := a.os.ReadDir("/run"); err != nil {
return err
} else {
b := make([]*FilesystemConfig, 0, len(d))
for _, ent := range d {
name := ent.Name()
switch name {
case "user":
case "dbus":
default:
p := "/run/" + name
b = append(b, &FilesystemConfig{Src: p, Write: true, Must: true})
}
}
conf.Filesystem = append(conf.Filesystem, b...)
}
// hide nscd from sandbox if present
nscd := "/var/run/nscd"
if _, err := a.os.Stat(nscd); !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
conf.Override = append(conf.Override, nscd)
}
// bind GPU stuff
if config.Confinement.Enablements.Has(system.EX11) || config.Confinement.Enablements.Has(system.EWayland) {
conf.Filesystem = append(conf.Filesystem, &FilesystemConfig{Src: "/dev/dri", Device: true})
}
// link host /etc to prevent passwd/group from being overwritten
if d, err := a.os.ReadDir("/etc"); err != nil {
return err
} else {
b := make([][2]string, 0, len(d))
for _, ent := range d {
name := ent.Name()
switch name {
case "passwd":
case "group":
case "mtab":
b = append(b, [2]string{
"/proc/mounts",
"/etc/" + name,
})
default:
b = append(b, [2]string{
"/dev/fortify/etc/" + name,
"/etc/" + name,
})
}
}
conf.Link = append(conf.Link, b...)
}
config.Confinement.Sandbox = conf
}
seal.sys.bwrap = config.Confinement.Sandbox.Bwrap()
seal.sys.override = config.Confinement.Sandbox.Override
if seal.sys.bwrap.SetEnv == nil {
seal.sys.bwrap.SetEnv = make(map[string]string)
}
// create wayland struct and client wait channel if mediated wayland is enabled
// this field being set enables mediated wayland setup later on
if config.Confinement.Sandbox.Wayland {
seal.wl = shim.NewWayland()
}
// open process state store
// the simple store only starts holding an open file after first action
// store activity begins after Start is called and must end before Wait
seal.store = state.NewSimple(seal.RunDirPath, seal.sys.user.Uid)
// parse string UID
if u, err := strconv.Atoi(seal.sys.user.Uid); err != nil {
// unreachable unless kernel bug
panic("uid parse")
} else {
seal.sys.I = system.New(u)
}
// pass through enablements
seal.et = config.Confinement.Enablements
// this method calls all share methods in sequence
if err := seal.shareAll([2]*dbus.Config{config.Confinement.SessionBus, config.Confinement.SystemBus}, a.os); err != nil {
return err
}
// verbose log seal information
fmsg.VPrintln("created application seal as user",
seal.sys.user.Username, "("+seal.sys.user.Uid+"),",
"method:", config.Method+",",
"launcher:", seal.toolPath+",",
"command:", config.Command)
// seal app and release lock
a.seal = seal
return nil
}