rewrite Private DNS question / answer

This commit is contained in:
Daniel Micay 2020-02-28 21:46:05 -05:00
parent 3c9ee6c04b
commit 17ed0acd26

View File

@ -66,13 +66,7 @@
bundled apps make by default?</a></li> bundled apps make by default?</a></li>
<li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular <li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular
tracking and silent SMS?</a></li> tracking and silent SMS?</a></li>
</ul> <li><a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP addresses?</a></li>
</li>
<li>
<a href="#day-to-day-use">Day to day use</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#private-dns">When I enter an IP address into private DNS,
the save button grays out. Why?</a></li>
</ul> </ul>
</li> </li>
</ul> </ul>
@ -368,28 +362,24 @@
sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices
connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p> connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p>
<h2 id="day-to-day-use"> <h3 id="private-dns-ip">
<a href="#day-to-day-use">Day to day use</a> <a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP addresses?</a>
</h2>
<h3 id="private-dns">
<a href="#private-dns">When I enter an IP address into private DNS, the save button
grays out. Why?</a>
</h3> </h3>
<p>This is not a bug, but rather the feature is operating as it is intended to. When <p>By default, in the automatic mode, the Private DNS feature provides opportunistic
operating in forced mode, private DNS requires a <em>domain</em> and will reject invalid encryption by using DNS-over-TLS when supported by the DNS server IP addresses
certificates to ensure that the source is authenticated, not just encrypted. Automatic provided by the network or the static IP configuration. Opportunistic encryption
mode only uses encryption opportunistically, and must be able to fall back to provides protection against a passive listener, not an active attacker, since they can
unauthenticated encryption or fall back to plaintext if the DNS server does not support force falling back to unencrypted DNS by blocking DNS-over-TLS. In the automatic mode,
DNS over TLS or the certificate is not valid. Although this does not protect against an certificate validation is not enforced, as it would provide no additional security and
active adversary that blocks encrypted communications to the DNS server or will replace would reduce the availability of opportunistic encryption.</p>
the certificates entirely to intercept the encrypted traffic, automatic will
transparently provide some opportunistic protection against a passive adversary. When a
private DNS provider hostname is specified, the phone will not proceed unless the
certificates for TLS are valid and will not fall back to an unauthenticated or plaintext
connection should the validation fail.</p>
<p>When Private DNS is explicitly enabled, it uses authenticated encryption without a
fallback. The authentication is performed based on the hostname of the server, so it
isn't possible to provide an IP address. The OS will look up the hostname of the Private
DNS server via unencrypted DNS and then force all other DNS lookups via DNS-over-TLS
with the identity of the server authenticated as part of providing authenticated
encryption.</p>
</div> </div>
<footer> <footer>
<a href="/"><img src="https://grapheneos.org/logo.png" width="512" height="512" alt=""/>GrapheneOS</a> <a href="/"><img src="https://grapheneos.org/logo.png" width="512" height="512" alt=""/>GrapheneOS</a>