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document early boot free memory zeroing

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Daniel Micay 2025-02-14 12:30:21 -05:00
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@ -387,6 +387,15 @@
released retains data indefinitely until the memory is handed
out for other uses and gets partially or fully overwritten by
new data.</li>
<li>In early boot, all the memory not being used by the OS is
zeroed to get rid of any data leftover from a previous boot in
case zero-on-free didn't have the opportunity to clear it as
part of a clean reboot/shutdown. All the devices we support have
a reset attack protection feature we proposed zeroing memory for
firmware-based boot modes, but we need to finish it up by adding
it for the OS boot modes ourselves. Fully encrypted RAM with a
per-boot key cycled on reboots will eventually obsolete these
features for newer devices.</li>
<li>Kernel stack allocations are zeroed to make most
uninitialized data usage vulnerabilities harmless.</li>
<li>Assorted attack surface reduction through disabling