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document early boot free memory zeroing

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Daniel Micay 2025-02-14 12:30:21 -05:00
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released retains data indefinitely until the memory is handed released retains data indefinitely until the memory is handed
out for other uses and gets partially or fully overwritten by out for other uses and gets partially or fully overwritten by
new data.</li> new data.</li>
<li>In early boot, all the memory not being used by the OS is
zeroed to get rid of any data leftover from a previous boot in
case zero-on-free didn't have the opportunity to clear it as
part of a clean reboot/shutdown. All the devices we support have
a reset attack protection feature we proposed zeroing memory for
firmware-based boot modes, but we need to finish it up by adding
it for the OS boot modes ourselves. Fully encrypted RAM with a
per-boot key cycled on reboots will eventually obsolete these
features for newer devices.</li>
<li>Kernel stack allocations are zeroed to make most <li>Kernel stack allocations are zeroed to make most
uninitialized data usage vulnerabilities harmless.</li> uninitialized data usage vulnerabilities harmless.</li>
<li>Assorted attack surface reduction through disabling <li>Assorted attack surface reduction through disabling