From 4eb320eca953f14a266c2cd67e6175190a077353 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Micay <daniel.micay@grapheneos.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 10:10:13 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] add link to key attestation library

---
 .../attestation-compatibility-guide.html        | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/static/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide.html b/static/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide.html
index db62d330..fe5f89fa 100644
--- a/static/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide.html
+++ b/static/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide.html
@@ -57,14 +57,15 @@
             with hardware attestation and fall back to the Play Integrity API or do both and
             accept either passing as success.</p>
 
-            <p>Our <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor">MIT / Apache 2 licensed Auditor
-            app</a> can be used a reference implementation for verifying hardware-based
-            attestations. There are some subtleties in the verification process such as making
-            sure only the 2nd certificate in the chain (the one signing the certificate for the
-            key generated by your app) has an attestation extension to prevent making a fake
-            attestation by extending the chain. You can reuse our code and simply omit support for
-            an app generated attestation signing key (attest key) and the other pinning
-            support.</p>
+            <p>Google provides a <a href="https://github.com/google/android-key-attestation">key
+            attestation library</a> with examples. Our <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor">MIT
+            / Apache 2 licensed Auditor app</a> can be used a reference implementation for
+            verifying hardware-based attestations. There are some subtleties in the verification
+            process such as making sure only the 2nd certificate in the chain (the one signing the
+            certificate for the key generated by your app) has an attestation extension to prevent
+            making a fake attestation by extending the chain. You can reuse our code and simply
+            omit support for an app generated attestation signing key (attest key) and the other
+            pinning support.</p>
 
             <p>After verifying the signature of the attestation certificate chain and extracting
             the attestation metadata, you can enforce that <code>verifiedBootState</code> is