GrapheneOS only makes a small change to remove a legacy form of access to the serial number by legacy apps, which was still around for compatibility.
+GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak + or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere + providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One + of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills + based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.
+ +Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive + capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular + network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the + device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as + Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on + the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the + cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular + radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.
+ +Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along + the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and + information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided + as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security + against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing + with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be + foolish and doomed to failure.
+ +Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell + carrier, police or government because anyone on the cell network can send + them including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether + or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a + useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving + unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger + alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless, + sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices + connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.
+GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak - or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere - providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One - of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills - based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.
- -Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive - capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular - network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the - device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as - Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on - the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the - cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular - radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.
- -Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along - the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and - information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided - as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security - against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing - with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be - foolish and doomed to failure.
- -Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell - carrier, police or government because anyone on the cell network can send - them including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether - or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a - useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving - unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger - alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless, - sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices - connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.
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