From 70fc36a6e2765f2419f4ac36b012166193e0632d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2020 05:16:55 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] reorder FAQ

---
 static/faq.html | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/static/faq.html b/static/faq.html
index 4933c154..c63ed287 100644
--- a/static/faq.html
+++ b/static/faq.html
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@
                     <ul>
                         <li><a href="#hardware-identifiers">Can apps access hardware
                         identifiers?</a></li>
-                        <li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and
-                        bundled apps make by default?</a></li>
                         <li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular
                         tracking and silent SMS?</a></li>
+                        <li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and
+                        bundled apps make by default?</a></li>
                         <li><a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a></li>
                         <li><a href="#custom-dns">How do I use a custom DNS server?</a></li>
                         <li><a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP
@@ -255,6 +255,44 @@
             <p>GrapheneOS only makes a small change to remove a legacy form of access to the
             serial number by legacy apps, which was still around for compatibility.</p>
 
+            <h3 id="cellular-tracking">
+                <a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and
+                silent SMS?</a>
+            </h3>
+
+            <p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak
+            or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere
+            providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One
+            of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills
+            based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p>
+
+            <p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive
+            capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular
+            network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the
+            device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as
+            Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on
+            the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the
+            cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular
+            radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p>
+
+            <p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along
+            the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and
+            information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided
+            as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security
+            against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing
+            with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be
+            foolish and doomed to failure.</p>
+
+            <p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell
+            carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send
+            them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether
+            or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a
+            useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving
+            unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger
+            alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless,
+            sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices
+            connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p>
+
             <h3 id="default-connections">
                 <a href="#default-connections">What kind of connections do the OS and bundled apps
                 make by default?</a>
@@ -338,44 +376,6 @@
                 </li>
             </ul>
 
-            <h3 id="cellular-tracking">
-                <a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and
-                silent SMS?</a>
-            </h3>
-
-            <p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak
-            or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere
-            providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One
-            of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills
-            based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p>
-
-            <p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive
-            capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular
-            network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the
-            device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as
-            Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on
-            the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the
-            cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular
-            radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p>
-
-            <p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along
-            the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and
-            information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided
-            as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security
-            against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing
-            with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be
-            foolish and doomed to failure.</p>
-
-            <p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell
-            carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send
-            them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether
-            or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a
-            useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving
-            unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger
-            alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless,
-            sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices
-            connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p>
-
             <h3 id="default-dns">
                 <a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a>
             </h3>