From 73b35a0cd7ef85f6da2cb77f6edbfd45079fe2d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Micay Date: Fri, 25 Dec 2020 00:35:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] mention the internal timer --- static/faq.html | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/static/faq.html b/static/faq.html index 1ad6f2c2..4d8fa92e 100644 --- a/static/faq.html +++ b/static/faq.html @@ -350,14 +350,14 @@ element (Titan M on Pixels) and uses it as another input for key derivation. The Weaver token is stored alongside a Weaver key derived by the OS from the password token. In order to retrieve the Weaver token, the secure element - requires the correct Weaver key. This is used to implement hardware-based - exponentially increasing delays for each attempt at key derivation and quickly - ramps up to 1 day per attempt. Weaver also provides reliable wiping of data - since the secure element can reliably wipe a Weaver slot. Deleting a profile - will wipe the corresponding Weaver slot and a factory reset of the device - wipes all of the Weaver slots. The secure element also provides insider attack - resistance preventing firmware updates before authenticating with the owner - profile.

+ requires the correct Weaver key. A secure internal timer is used to implement + hardware-based exponentially increasing delays for each attempt at key + derivation and quickly ramps up to 1 day per attempt. Weaver also provides + reliable wiping of data since the secure element can reliably wipe a Weaver + slot. Deleting a profile will wipe the corresponding Weaver slot and a factory + reset of the device wipes all of the Weaver slots. The secure element also + provides insider attack resistance preventing firmware updates before + authenticating with the owner profile.

GrapheneOS only officially supports devices with Weaver. The fallback implementation for devices without it is out-of-scope for this FAQ.