more clarifications on Private DNS
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<li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular
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<li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular
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tracking and silent SMS?</a></li>
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tracking and silent SMS?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#dns">How do I use a custom DNS server?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#dns">How do I use a custom DNS server?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP addresses?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP
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addresses?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#private-dns-other">Does DNS-over-TLS (Private DNS) protect
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other connections?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#private-dns-visited">Does DNS-over-TLS (Private DNS) hide
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which sites are visited, etc.?</a></li>
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</ul>
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</ul>
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</li>
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</li>
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</ul>
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</ul>
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@ -402,6 +407,31 @@
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DNS server via unencrypted DNS and then force all other DNS lookups via DNS-over-TLS
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DNS server via unencrypted DNS and then force all other DNS lookups via DNS-over-TLS
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with the identity of the server authenticated as part of providing authenticated
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with the identity of the server authenticated as part of providing authenticated
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encryption.</p>
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encryption.</p>
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<h3 id="private-dns-other">
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<a href="#private-dns-other">Does DNS-over-TLS (Private DNS) protect other connections?</a>
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</h3>
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<p>No, it only provides privacy for DNS resolution. Even authenticating DNS results
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with DNSSEC does not protect other connections, unless the DNS records are part of the
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system used to provide authenticated encryption, and DNS-over-TLS is not a substitute
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for DNSSEC. If connections have authenticated encryption, they're secure even if DNS
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resolution is hijacked by an attacker. If connections do not have authenticated
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encryption, an attacker can listen in and tamper with them without hijacking DNS.
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There are other ways to perform a MITM attack than DNS hijacking and internet routing
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is fundamentally insecure. DNS-over-TLS may make a MITM harder for some attackers, but
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don't count on it at all.</p>
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<h3 id="private-dns-visited">
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<a href="#private-dns-visited">Does DNS-over-TLS (Private DNS) hide which sites are visited, etc.?</a>
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</h3>
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<p>Private DNS only encrypts DNS, and an adversary monitoring connections can still
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see the IP address at the other end of those connections. Many domains resolve to
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ambiguous IP addresses, so encrypted DNS is part of what's required to take away a lot
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of the information leaked to adversaries. However, TLS currently leaks domains via
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SNI, so encrypted DNS is not yet accomplishing much. It's a forward looking feature
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that will become more useful in the future.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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<footer>
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<footer>
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<a href="/"><img src="https://grapheneos.org/logo.png" width="512" height="512" alt=""/>GrapheneOS</a>
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<a href="/"><img src="https://grapheneos.org/logo.png" width="512" height="512" alt=""/>GrapheneOS</a>
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