integrate obtaining signify into install process

This commit is contained in:
Daniel Micay 2021-01-03 21:44:34 -05:00
parent f1214b8044
commit a88a4d1563

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@ -67,12 +67,12 @@
<li><a href="#checking-fastboot-version">Checking fastboot version</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#obtaining-signify">Obtaining signify</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#enabling-oem-unlocking">Enabling OEM unlocking</a></li>
<li><a href="#connecting-phone">Connecting the phone</a></li>
<li><a href="#unlocking-the-bootloader">Unlocking the bootloader</a></li>
<li><a href="#obtaining-signify">Obtaining signify</a></li>
<li><a href="#obtaining-factory-images">Obtaining factory images</a></li>
<li>
<a href="#flashing-factory-images">Flashing factory images</a>
@ -224,35 +224,6 @@ tar xvf platform-tools_r30.0.5-windows.zip</pre>
Installed as /home/username/platform-tools/fastboot</pre>
</section>
</section>
<section id="obtaining-signify">
<h3><a href="#obtaining-signify">Obtaining signify</a></h3>
<p>To verify the download of the OS beyond the security offered by HTTPS, you can use
the signify tool. If you do not have a way to obtain signify from a package repository
you're already trusting, it does not make sense to use it. GrapheneOS releases are
hosted on our servers and we do not have third party mirrors. A compromised signify
would be able to compromise your OS and the GrapheneOS download due to the lack of an
application security model on traditional operating systems. It would be worse than
not trying to verify the signatures. It's far less likely that our servers would be
compromised than someone's GitHub account or GitHub itself. You're already trusting
these installation instructions from our site, which is hosted on the same static web
server infrastructure as the releases.</p>
<p>List of distribution packages:</p>
<ul>
<li>Arch Linux: <code>signify</code></li>
<li>Debian: <code>signify-openbsd</code> with the command renamed to <code>signify-openbsd</code></li>
<li>Ubuntu: <code>signify-openbsd</code> with the command renamed to <code>signify-openbsd</code></li>
</ul>
<p>On Debian-based distributions, the <code>signify</code> package and command are an
<a href="http://signify.sourceforge.net/" rel="nofollow">unmaintained mail-related
tool for generating mail signatures (not cryptographic signatures)</a> with the final
releases from 2003-2004 made directly by the developer via the Debian package without
upstream releases. Please pressure them to correct this usability issue.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="enabling-oem-unlocking">
@ -287,6 +258,31 @@ Installed as /home/username/platform-tools/fastboot</pre>
<p>The command needs to be confirmed on the device and will wipe all data.</p>
</section>
<section id="obtaining-signify">
<h2><a href="#obtaining-signify">Obtaining signify</a></h2>
<p>On the supported Linux distributions, the signify tool is used to verify the
download of the OS beyond the security offered by HTTPS. You should skip this on
macOS and Windows. It only makes sense to do this if you can obtain signify from
the distribution package repositories. GrapheneOS releases are hosted on our
servers and we do not have third party mirrors.</p>
<p>On Arch Linux:</p>
<pre>sudo pacman -S signify</pre>
<p>On Debian and Ubuntu</p>
<pre>sudo apt install signify-openbsd
alias signify=signify-openbsd</pre>
<p>On Debian-based distributions, the <code>signify</code> package and command are an
<a href="http://signify.sourceforge.net/" rel="nofollow">unmaintained mail-related
tool for generating mail signatures (not cryptographic signatures)</a> with the final
releases from 2003-2004 made directly by the developer via the Debian package without
upstream releases. Make sure to install <code>signify-openbsd</code>.</p>
</section>
<section id="obtaining-factory-images">
<h2><a href="#obtaining-factory-images">Obtaining factory images</a></h2>