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split out privacy by default section

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Daniel Micay 2022-05-09 18:03:46 -04:00
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@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
<li><a href="#private-screenshots">Private screenshots</a></li>
<li><a href="#closed-device-identifier-leaks">Closed device identifier leaks</a></li>
<li><a href="#pin-scrambling">PIN scrambling</a></li>
<li><a href="#privacy-by-default">Privacy by default</a></li>
<li><a href="#supports-longer-passwords">Supports longer
passwords</a></li>
<li><a href="#more-secure-fingerprint-unlock">More secure fingerprint
@ -589,6 +590,49 @@
physical proximity or a side channel.</p>
</section>
<section id="privacy-by-default">
<h3><a href="#privacy-by-default">Privacy by default</a></h3>
<p>GrapheneOS doesn't include or use Google apps and services by default and
avoids including any other apps/services not aligned with our privacy and
security focus. Google apps and services can be used on GrapheneOS as regular
sandboxed apps without any special access or privileges through our <a
href="#sandboxed-google-play">sandboxed Google Play</a> feature, but we don't
include those apps by default to give users an explicit choice on whether they
want to use those apps and which profiles they want to use it in.</p>
<p>We change the default settings to prefer privacy over small conveniences:
personalized keyboard suggestions based on gathering input history are
disabled by default, sensitive notifications are hidden on the lockscreen by
default and passwords are hidden during entry by default.</p>
<p>Some of our changes for <a href="#attack-surface-reduction">attack surface
reduction</a> can also improve privacy by default by not exposing unnecessary
radios, etc. by default and avoiding the impact of potential privacy bugs with
the hardware.</p>
<p>By default, we also use GrapheneOS servers for the following services
instead of Google servers:</p>
<ul>
<li>Connectivity checks</li>
<li>Attestation key provisioning</li>
<li>GNSS almanac downloads (PSDS) on 6th generation Pixels</li>
<li>Network time</li>
</ul>
<p>We provide a toggle to switch back to Google's servers for connectivity
checks, attestation key provisioning and GNSS almanac downloads along with
adding proper support for disabling network time connections. This combines
with other toggles to allow making a GrapheneOS device appear to be an AOSP
device. This is only particularly important for connectivity checks since the
other connections get routed through a VPN which is needed to blend in on a
local network in practice.</p>
<p>See our <a href="/faq#default-connections">default connections FAQ entry
for much more detailed information</a>.</p>
</section>
<section id="supports-longer-passwords">
<h3><a href="#supports-longer-passwords">Supports longer passwords</a></h3>
@ -698,31 +742,17 @@
certificate / key expiry, etc.</li>
<li>Proper support for disabling network time updates rather than just not using
the results</li>
<li>Connectivity checks via a first party server with the option to revert to the
standard checks (to blend in) or to fully disable them</li>
<li>Attestation key provisioning via a first party server with the option to
revert to the standard server</li>
<li>GNSS almanac downloads (PSDS) via a first party server with the option to
revert to the standard server (not available for all GPS vendors yet)</li>
<li>Hardened local build / signing infrastructure</li>
<li><a href="/usage#updates">Seamless automatic OS update system</a> that just
works and stays out of the way in the background without disrupting device
usage, with full support for the standard automatic rollback if the first boot
of the updated OS fails</li>
<li>Require unlocking to access sensitive functionality via quick tiles</li>
<li>Minor changes to default settings to prefer privacy over small conveniences:
personalized keyboard suggestions based on gathering input history are disabled by
default, sensitive notifications are hidden on the lockscreen by default and
passwords are hidden during entry by default</li>
<li><a href="/faq#bundled-apps">Minimal bundled apps and services</a>. Only
essential apps are integrated into the OS. We don't make partnerships with
apps and services to bundle them into the OS. An app may be the best choice
today and poor choice in the future. Our approach will be recommending certain
apps during the initial setup, not hard-wiring them into the OS.</li>
<li>No Google apps and services. These can be used on GrapheneOS but only if
they avoid requiring invasive OS integration. Building privileged support for
Google services into the OS isn't something we're going to be doing, even if
that's partially open source like microG.</li>
</ul>
</section>
</section>