split out privacy by default section
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<li><a href="#private-screenshots">Private screenshots</a></li>
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<li><a href="#closed-device-identifier-leaks">Closed device identifier leaks</a></li>
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<li><a href="#pin-scrambling">PIN scrambling</a></li>
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<li><a href="#privacy-by-default">Privacy by default</a></li>
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<li><a href="#supports-longer-passwords">Supports longer
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passwords</a></li>
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<li><a href="#more-secure-fingerprint-unlock">More secure fingerprint
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@ -589,6 +590,49 @@
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physical proximity or a side channel.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="privacy-by-default">
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<h3><a href="#privacy-by-default">Privacy by default</a></h3>
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<p>GrapheneOS doesn't include or use Google apps and services by default and
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avoids including any other apps/services not aligned with our privacy and
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security focus. Google apps and services can be used on GrapheneOS as regular
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sandboxed apps without any special access or privileges through our <a
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href="#sandboxed-google-play">sandboxed Google Play</a> feature, but we don't
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include those apps by default to give users an explicit choice on whether they
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want to use those apps and which profiles they want to use it in.</p>
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<p>We change the default settings to prefer privacy over small conveniences:
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personalized keyboard suggestions based on gathering input history are
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disabled by default, sensitive notifications are hidden on the lockscreen by
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default and passwords are hidden during entry by default.</p>
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<p>Some of our changes for <a href="#attack-surface-reduction">attack surface
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reduction</a> can also improve privacy by default by not exposing unnecessary
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radios, etc. by default and avoiding the impact of potential privacy bugs with
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the hardware.</p>
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<p>By default, we also use GrapheneOS servers for the following services
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instead of Google servers:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>Connectivity checks</li>
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<li>Attestation key provisioning</li>
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<li>GNSS almanac downloads (PSDS) on 6th generation Pixels</li>
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<li>Network time</li>
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</ul>
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<p>We provide a toggle to switch back to Google's servers for connectivity
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checks, attestation key provisioning and GNSS almanac downloads along with
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adding proper support for disabling network time connections. This combines
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with other toggles to allow making a GrapheneOS device appear to be an AOSP
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device. This is only particularly important for connectivity checks since the
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other connections get routed through a VPN which is needed to blend in on a
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local network in practice.</p>
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<p>See our <a href="/faq#default-connections">default connections FAQ entry
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for much more detailed information</a>.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="supports-longer-passwords">
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<h3><a href="#supports-longer-passwords">Supports longer passwords</a></h3>
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@ -698,31 +742,17 @@
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certificate / key expiry, etc.</li>
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<li>Proper support for disabling network time updates rather than just not using
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the results</li>
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<li>Connectivity checks via a first party server with the option to revert to the
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standard checks (to blend in) or to fully disable them</li>
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<li>Attestation key provisioning via a first party server with the option to
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revert to the standard server</li>
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<li>GNSS almanac downloads (PSDS) via a first party server with the option to
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revert to the standard server (not available for all GPS vendors yet)</li>
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<li>Hardened local build / signing infrastructure</li>
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<li><a href="/usage#updates">Seamless automatic OS update system</a> that just
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works and stays out of the way in the background without disrupting device
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usage, with full support for the standard automatic rollback if the first boot
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of the updated OS fails</li>
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<li>Require unlocking to access sensitive functionality via quick tiles</li>
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<li>Minor changes to default settings to prefer privacy over small conveniences:
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personalized keyboard suggestions based on gathering input history are disabled by
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default, sensitive notifications are hidden on the lockscreen by default and
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passwords are hidden during entry by default</li>
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<li><a href="/faq#bundled-apps">Minimal bundled apps and services</a>. Only
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essential apps are integrated into the OS. We don't make partnerships with
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apps and services to bundle them into the OS. An app may be the best choice
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today and poor choice in the future. Our approach will be recommending certain
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apps during the initial setup, not hard-wiring them into the OS.</li>
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<li>No Google apps and services. These can be used on GrapheneOS but only if
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they avoid requiring invasive OS integration. Building privileged support for
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Google services into the OS isn't something we're going to be doing, even if
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that's partially open source like microG.</li>
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</ul>
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</section>
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</section>
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