improve Network permission docs in FAQ
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<article id="firewall">
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<article id="firewall">
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<h3><a href="#firewall">Does GrapheneOS provide a firewall?</a></h3>
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<h3><a href="#firewall">Does GrapheneOS provide a firewall?</a></h3>
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<p>Yes, GrapheneOS inherits the deeply integrated firewall from the Android Open
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<p>Yes, GrapheneOS inherits the deeply integrated firewall from the Android
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Source Project, which is used to implement portions of the security model and various
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Open Source Project, which is used to implement portions of the security model
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other features. The GrapheneOS project historically made various improvements to the
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and various other features. The GrapheneOS project historically made various
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firewall but over time most of these changes have been integrated upstream or became
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improvements to the firewall but over time most of these changes have been
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irrelevant.</p>
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integrated upstream or became irrelevant.</p>
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<p>GrapheneOS adds a user-facing Network permission toggle providing a robust way to
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<p>GrapheneOS adds a user-facing Network permission toggle providing a robust
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deny both direct and indirect network access to applications. It builds upon the
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way to deny both direct and indirect network access to applications. It builds
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standard non-user-facing INTERNET permission, so it's already fully adopted by the app
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upon the standard non-user-facing INTERNET permission, so it's already fully
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ecosystem. Revoking the permission denies indirect access via OS components and apps
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adopted by the app ecosystem. Revoking the permission denies indirect access
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enforcing the INTERNET permission, such as DownloadManager. Direct access is denied
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via OS components and apps enforcing the INTERNET permission, such as
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by blocking low-level network socket access.</p>
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DownloadManager. Direct access is denied by blocking low-level network socket
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access. A packet-based firewall would only block direct access so our approach
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is much more complete. Additionally, GrapheneOS pretends that the Network is
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down for most APIs when the Network permission is disabled. For example, it
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won't run scheduled jobs depending internet availability and most APIs for
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checking the state of the network will report it as down and internet access
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as unavailable. This means apps won't try to keep trying to access the
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internet and draining battery because they'll treat it the way they do when
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internet access is genuinely unavailable.</p>
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</article>
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</article>
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<article id="ad-blocking">
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<article id="ad-blocking">
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