usage: add section on web browsers
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<p>Similar connectivity checks are also performed by the hardened Chromium browser (Vanadium).</p>
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<p>Similar connectivity checks are also performed by the hardened Chromium browser (Vanadium).</p>
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<h2 id="web-browsing">
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<a href="#web-browsing">Web browsing</a>
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</h2>
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<p>GrapheneOS includes a Vanadium subproject providing privacy and security enhanced
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releases of Chromium. Vanadium is both the user-facing browser included in the OS and
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the provider of the WebView used by other apps to render web content. The WebView is
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the browser engine used by the vast majority of web browsers and nearly all other apps
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embedding web content or using web technologies for other uses.</p>
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<p>Using Vanadium is highly recommended and Bromite is a good alternative if you want
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a few more features like ad-blocking and more aggressive anti-fingerprinting. Vanadium
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is working towards including these features and is actively collaborating with
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Bromite. Other Chromium-based browsers like Brave can also be decent choices.
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Standalone browsers based on Chromium have by far the best sandbox implementation.
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Site isolation can also be enabled, which makes the sandbox enforce a security
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boundary containing each site rather than isolating content as a whole. Vanadium
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enables site isolation by default, and Bromite enables it on high memory devices,
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including all officially supported GrapheneOS devices. Site isolation prevents an
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attacker from obtaining cookies (like login sessions) and other data tied to other
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sites if they successfully exploit the browser's rendering engine. It also provides
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the strongest available mitigation for Spectre-based side channel attacks.</p>
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<p>WebView-based browsers use the hardened Vanadium rendering engine, but they can't
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offer as much privacy and control due to being limited to the capabilities supported
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by the WebView widget. For example, they can't provide a setting for toggling sensors
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access because the feature is fairly new and the WebView WebSettings API doesn't yet
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include support for it as it does for JavaScript, location, cookies, DOM storage and
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other older features. The WebView sandbox also currently runs every instance within
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the same process and doesn't support site isolation.</p>
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<p>Avoid Gecko-based browsers like Firefox as they're currently much more vulnerable
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to exploitation and inherently add a huge amount of attack surface. Gecko doesn't have
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a WebView implementation, so it has to be used alongside the Chromium-based WebView
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rather than instead of Chromium, which means having the remote attack surface of two
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separate browser engines instead of only one. Firefox / Gecko also bypass or cripple a
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fair bit of the upstream and GrapheneOS hardening work for apps. Worst of all, Firefox
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runs as a single process on mobile and has no sandbox beyond the OS sandbox. This is
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despite the fact that Chromium semantic sandbox layer on Android is implemented via
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the OS <code>isolatedProcess</code> feature, which is a very easy to use boolean
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property for app service processes to provide strong isolation with only the ability
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to communicate with the app running them via the standard service API. Even in the
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desktop version, Firefox's sandbox is still substantially weaker (especially on Linux,
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where it can hardly be considered a sandbox at all) and lacks support for isolating
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sites from each other rather than only containing content as a whole.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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<footer>
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<footer>
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<a href="/"><img src="https://grapheneos.org/logo.png" width="512" height="512" alt=""/>GrapheneOS</a>
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<a href="/"><img src="https://grapheneos.org/logo.png" width="512" height="512" alt=""/>GrapheneOS</a>
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