1410 lines
98 KiB
HTML
1410 lines
98 KiB
HTML
<!DOCTYPE html>
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<head>
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[[js|/js/redirect.js]]
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</head>
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<body>
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{% with current_page="usage" %}
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{% include "header.html" %}
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{% endwith %}
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<main id="usage">
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<h1><a href="#usage">Usage guide</a></h1>
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<p>This is a guide covering some aspects of using GrapheneOS. See the
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<a href="/features">features page</a> for a list of GrapheneOS features.</p>
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<nav id="table-of-contents">
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<h2><a href="#table-of-contents">Table of contents</a></h2>
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<ul>
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<li>
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<a href="#system-navigation">System navigation</a>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#gesture-navigation">Gesture navigation</a></li>
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<li><a href="#3-button-navigation">3-button navigation</a></li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li>
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<a href="#storage-access">Storage access</a>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#storage-scopes">Storage Scopes</a></li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li><a href="#contact-scopes">Contact Scopes</a></li>
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<li><a href="#accessibility">Accessibility</a></li>
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<li><a href="#auditor">Auditor</a></li>
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<li>
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<a href="#updates">Updates</a>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#updates-settings">Settings</a></li>
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<li><a href="#updates-security">Security</a></li>
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<li><a href="#updates-disabling">Disabling</a></li>
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<li><a href="#updates-sideloading">Sideloading</a></li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li><a href="#usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control">USB-C port and pogo pins control</a></li>
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<li><a href="#web-browsing">Web browsing</a></li>
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<li>
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<a href="#camera">Camera</a>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#grapheneos-camera-app">GrapheneOS Camera app</a></li>
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<li><a href="#pixel-camera">Pixel Camera</a></li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li><a href="#exec-spawning">Exec spawning</a></li>
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<li><a href="#bugs-uncovered-by-security-features">Bugs uncovered by security features</a></li>
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<li>
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<a href="#wifi-privacy">Wi-Fi privacy</a>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#wifi-privacy-scanning">Scanning</a></li>
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<li><a href="#wifi-privacy-associated">Associated with an Access Point (AP)</a></li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li><a href="#lte-only-mode">LTE-only mode</a></li>
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<li>
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<a href="#sandboxed-google-play">Sandboxed Google Play</a>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#sandboxed-google-play-installation">Installation</a></li>
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<li><a href="#sandboxed-google-play-configuration">Configuration</a></li>
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<li><a href="#sandboxed-google-play-limitations">Limitations</a></li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li><a href="#esim-support">eSIM support</a></li>
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<li><a href="#android-auto">Android Auto</a></li>
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<li><a href="#banking-apps">Banking apps</a></li>
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<li><a href="#app-link-verification">App link verification</a></li>
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<li><a href="#carrier-functionality">Carrier functionality</a></li>
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</ul>
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</nav>
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<section id="system-navigation">
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<h2><a href="#system-navigation">System navigation</a></h2>
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<p>By default, GrapheneOS uses gesture-based navigation. We recommend reading our
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guide on gesture navigation and giving it a chance even if you think you won't
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like it. Our experience is that when armed with the appropriate knowledge, the
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vast majority of users prefer the newer gesture navigation approach.</p>
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<p>The system navigation mode can be configured in <b>Settings <span
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aria-label="and then">></span> System <span aria-label="and then">></span>
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Gestures <span aria-label="and then">></span> Navigation
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mode</b>. The same menu is also available in <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span>
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Accessibility <span aria-label="and then">></span> System
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controls <span aria-label="and then">></span> Navigation mode</b>.</p>
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<section id="gesture-navigation">
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<h3><a href="#gesture-navigation">Gesture navigation</a></h3>
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<p>The bottom of the screen is a reserved touch zone for system navigation. A
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line is displayed in the center to show that the navigation bar is present
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across the entire bottom of the screen. In most apps, this area will display
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padding. Modern apps are able to tell the OS that they can handle not having
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the padding to display app content there while still not being able to receive
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touches from it. Open up the Settings app for an example.</p>
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<p>Swiping up from the navigation bar while removing your finger from the
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screen is the <strong>Home</strong> gesture.</p>
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<p>Swiping up from the navigation bar while holding your finger on the screen
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before releasing is the <strong>Recent Apps</strong> gesture. The most
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recently opened activity is always on the furthest right. Each step left goes
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one step back through the history of recently opened apps. Opening an app with
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the recent apps activity will place it on the furthest right in the recent
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apps order just like a new app being opened.</p>
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<p>The recent apps activity has a screenshot button as an alternative to
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holding power and volume down while using an app.</p>
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<p>Rather than opening the recent apps activity, you can swipe left on the
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navigation bar for the <strong>Previous</strong> app and swipe right for the
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<strong>Next</strong> app. This will not change the recent apps order. This is
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usually the best way to navigate through recent apps.</p>
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<p>Swiping from either the left or the right of the screen within the app (not
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the navigation bar) is the <strong>Back</strong> gesture. Apps are supposed to
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avoid implementing conflicting gestures, but have the option to override this
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gesture if they truly need to get rid of it. Some legacy apps without active
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development of their UI still haven't addressed this despite gestures being
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the default for several years on Google Android. You can avoid triggering the
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back gesture in one of 2 easy ways: avoid swiping from right near the edge or
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hold your finger on the side of the screen for a moment before swiping. The
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more advanced option is using a diagonal swipe pointing sharply to the bottom
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of the screen since this will bypass the back gesture but will still trigger
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most app gestures. The advanced option is the most convenient approach once
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you get used to doing it.</p>
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<p>The launcher uses a swipe up gesture starting anywhere on the screen to
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open the app drawer from the home screen. You need to start that gesture above
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the system navigation bar since any gesture starting on the navigation bar is
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handled by the OS as a system navigation gesture.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="3-button-navigation">
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<h3><a href="#3-button-navigation">3-button navigation</a></h3>
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<p>3-button navigation is Android's oldest touchscreen-based navigation
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system. It will remain supported for the foreseeable future to provide
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accessibility for users unable to easily use the gestures. It's older than
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2-button navigation but isn't considered a legacy feature.</p>
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<p>A large row across the bottom of the screen is reserved for navigation
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buttons. The <strong>Back</strong> button is on the left, the
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<strong>Home</strong> button is in the center and the <strong>Recent
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Apps</strong> button is on the right.</p>
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<p>In the recent apps activity, the most recently opened activity is always on
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the furthest right. Each step left goes one step back through the history of
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recently opened apps. Opening an app with the recent apps activity will place
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it on the furthest right in the recent apps order just like a new app being
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opened.</p>
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<p>The recent apps activity has a screenshot button as an alternative to
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holding power and volume down while using an app.</p>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section id="storage-access">
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<h2><a href="#storage-access">Storage access</a></h2>
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<p>GrapheneOS inherits the same baseline approach to storage access as modern
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Android and extends it with our Storage Scopes feature as a fully compatible
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alternative to standard Android storage permissions. This section provides an
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overview of the standard approach to storage access primarily to provide context
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for explaining Storage Scopes.</p>
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<p>There are two types of app-accessible storage:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>app-private ("internal") storage:
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<ul>
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<li>inaccessible to other apps</li>
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<li>doesn't require any permission for full access</li>
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<li>cleared when the app is uninstalled</li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li>shared ("external") storage:
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<ul>
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<li>shared with other apps</li>
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<li>access is regulated with permissions</li>
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<li>files persist after uninstallation</li>
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</ul>
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Android/data/ and Android/obb/ directories aren't considered to be parts
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of shared storage.
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</li>
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</ul>
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<p>For modern apps, access to the shared storage is controlled in the following way:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>Without any storage permission, an app is allowed to:
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<ul>
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<li>create media files in standard directories (audio in Music/,
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Ringtones/, etc, images in Pictures/ and DCIM/, videos in DCIM/
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and Movies/)</li>
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<li>create files of any type (both media and non-media) in Documents/
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and Download/</li>
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<li>create new directories inside standard directories</li>
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<li>rename/delete files that were created by the app itself</li>
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<li>rename/delete directories if it can rename/delete all files within
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those directories</li>
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</ul>
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</li>
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<li>Media access permission ("Allow access to media only",
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<code>READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE</code>) allows the app to read media files
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that were created by other apps. Non-media files remain invisible to it.
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For apps targeting Android 13, the media access permission is split into
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<code>READ_MEDIA_IMAGES</code>, <code>READ_MEDIA_VIDEO</code> and
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<code>READ_MEDIA_AUDIO</code>.</li>
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<li>Media management special access permission ("Allow app to manage media",
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<code>MANAGE_MEDIA</code>) allows the app to delete and to rename media
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files created by other apps.</li>
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<li>"All files access" special access permission (<code>MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE</code>)
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allows the app to read, create, rename and delete files and directories
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of any type in any directory of the shared storage (including the root
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directory).</li>
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</ul>
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<p>For legacy apps (those that target Android 9 or lower and those that target
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Android 10 and request legacy storage mode), storage access permissions have
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a different meaning:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>Without a storage permission, app is not allowed any type of access to
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any files or directories inside the shared storage.</li>
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<li><code>READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE</code> permission allows the app to read both
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media and non-media files in any directory.</li>
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<li><code>WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE</code> permission allows the app to create,
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rename and delete files (of any type) and directories in any directory of
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shared storage (including the root directory).</li>
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</ul>
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<p>Additionally, both modern and legacy Android apps can open the system file
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picker interface to have the user store or load one or more files/directories on
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their behalf. This type of access doesn't require any of the permissions listed
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above. Using this approach gives the user control over where files are stored in
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their home directory and which files/directories can be used by the app. This is
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based on the Storage Access Framework (SAF) introduced in Android 4.4. SAF allows
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the user to grant access to files/directories in their home directory, external
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drives and also app-based storage providers such as network shares, cloud storage,
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an encrypted volume, an external drive with a filesystem the OS doesn't support
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for external drives, etc. This is the only way to use those app-based storage
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providers and modern Android has removed the legacy approach for accessing
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external drives.</p>
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<section id="storage-scopes">
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<h3><a href="#storage-scopes">Storage Scopes</a></h3>
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<p>GrapheneOS provides the Storage Scopes feature as a fully compatible alternative
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to the standard Android storage permissions.
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Storage Scopes can be enabled only if the app doesn't have any storage permission.
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Enabling Storage Scopes makes the app assume that it has all of storage permissions
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that were requested by it, despite not actually having any of them.</p>
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<p>This means that the app can't see any of the files that were created by other apps.
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The app is still allowed to create files and directories, same as any other modern
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app that doesn't have any storage access permission.</p>
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<p>Apps that would normally use the legacy storage mode are switched to the
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modern storage mode when Storage Scopes is enabled.</p>
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<p>If the app requests the "All files access" permission (or is a legacy app
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that requests <code>WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE</code> permission), then the write
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restrictions that are normally applied to apps that don't have a storage access
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permission are relaxed to provide the same write access that the app would have if
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it was granted the "All files access" permission.
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This is done to ensure compatibility with apps that, for example, create a new
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directory in the root of shared storage, or write a text file (eg lyrics.txt) to
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the Music/ directory (normally, only audio files can be placed there).
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No additional read access is granted to such apps, they still can see only their
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own files.
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</p>
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<p>For all other apps, enabling Storage Scopes doesn't grant any additional
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storage access beyond what a modern app that doesn't have any storage permission
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already has.</p>
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<p>Optionally, users can specify which of the files created by other apps the app
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can access. Access can be granted to a specific file or to all files in
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a directory. The standard SAF picker is used for this purpose in a special mode
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where it shows only shared storage files/directories.</p>
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<p>The most significant limitation of Storage Scopes is the fact that the app
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will lose access to files that it created if it's uninstalled and then installed
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again, same as any other app that doesn't have a storage access permission.
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As a workaround, users can manually grant access to these files/directories via
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SAF picker.</p>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section id="contact-scopes">
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<h2><a href="#contact-scopes">Contact Scopes</a></h2>
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<p>On Android, contact access is controlled with an all-or-nothing Contacts permission, which grants
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both read and write access to all contacts stored on the device.</p>
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<p>A lot of apps (e.g. popular messaging apps) refuse to work unless the Contacts permission is granted.</p>
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<p>GrapheneOS provides the Contact Scopes feature as an alternative to granting the Contacts permission.
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Enabling Contact Scopes makes the app assume that it has the Contacts permission, despite not actually
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having it. By default, an app that has Contact Scopes enabled is not allowed any kind of contact access.</p>
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<p>Optionally, read access can be granted to the following scopes:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>Contact data (phone number or email). Access to each type of number and email in a contact is
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granted separately. Access to the contact name is granted automatically.</li>
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<li>Single contact. Access is granted to all contact data, except contact photo.</li>
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<li>Contact group ("label"). Equivalent to granting access to all contacts in the group. Any contact
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can be in any number of contact groups.</li>
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</ul>
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<p>The type and name of the account that the contact is stored in are fully hidden from the app. The name
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of the contact account is usually the same as the email address of that account.</p>
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<p>When Contact Scopes is enabled, write access is fully blocked: the app is not allowed to edit any
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contact data, add or remove contacts, etc.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="accessibility">
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<h2><a href="#accessibility">Accessibility</a></h2>
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<p>GrapheneOS includes all of the accessibility features from the Android Open
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Source Project and strives to fill in the gaps from not including Google apps and
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services. We include our own fork of the open source TalkBack accessibility
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service along with a Monochromacy option for the standard color correction
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menu.</p>
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<p>GrapheneOS does not yet include a text-to-speech (TTS) service in the base OS
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due to limitations of the available options. Including one is planned in the
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future when a suitable option is available. RHVoice and eSpeak NG are both open
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source and are the most common choices by GrapheneOS users. Both of these work
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fine but have licensing issues. eSpeak NG has added Direct Boot based on our
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request for it, meaning it is able to function before the first unlock. RHVoice is
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missing Direct Boot and can't run before the first unlock. Installing and setting
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up either one of these or another TTS app will get TalkBack working. TalkBack
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itself supports Direct Boot and works before the first unlock but it needs to have
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a TTS app supporting it in order to do more than playing the activation sound
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before the first unlock. After installing a TTS service, you need to select it in
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the OS configuration to accept activating it. The OS will display one of them as
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already selected, but it won't simply work from being installed as that wouldn't
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be safe. This is the same as the stock OS but it comes with one set up
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already.</p>
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<p>GrapheneOS disables showing the characters as passwords are typed by default. You
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can enable this in <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span>
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Security & privacy <span aria-label="and then">></span> Privacy <span
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aria-label="and then">></span> Show passwords</b>.</p>
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<p>Third party accessibility services can be installed and activated. This
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includes the ones made by Google. Most of these will work but some may have a hard
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dependency on functionality from Google Play services for some of their
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functionality or to run at all. Accessibility services are very powerful and we
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strongly recommend against using third party implementations if you can get by
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well without them. We plan to add safeguards in this area while still keeping them
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working without problematic barriers.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="auditor">
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<h2><a href="#auditor">Auditor</a></h2>
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<p>See the <a href="https://attestation.app/tutorial">tutorial page on the site for the attestation sub-project</a>.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="updates">
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<h2><a href="#updates">Updates</a></h2>
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<p>The update system implements automatic background updates. It checks for updates
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approximately once every six hours when there's network connectivity and then
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downloads and installs updates in the background. It will pick up where it left off if
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downloads are interrupted, so you don't need to worry about interrupting it.
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Similarly, interrupting the installation isn't a risk because updates are installed to
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a secondary installation of GrapheneOS which only becomes the active installation
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after the update is complete. Once the update is complete, you'll be informed with a
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notification and simply need to reboot with the button in the notification or via a
|
|
normal reboot. If the new version fails to boot, the OS will be rolled back to the
|
|
past version and the updater will attempt to download and install the update
|
|
again.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The updater will use incremental (delta) updates to download only changes rather
|
|
than the whole OS when one is available to go directly from the installed version to
|
|
the latest version. As long as you have working network connectivity on a regular
|
|
basis and reboot when asked, you'll almost always be on one of the past couple
|
|
versions of the OS which will minimize bandwidth usage since incrementals will always
|
|
be available.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The updater works while the device is locked / idle, including before the first
|
|
unlock since it's explicitly designed to be able to run before decryption of user
|
|
data.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Release changelogs are available <a href="/releases#changelog">in a section on the releases page</a>.</p>
|
|
|
|
<section id="updates-settings">
|
|
<h3><a href="#updates-settings">Settings</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>The settings are available in the Settings app in <b>System <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> System update</b>.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The "Check for updates" option will manually trigger an update check as soon as
|
|
possible. It will still wait for the configuration conditions listed below to be
|
|
satisfied, such as being connected to the internet via one of the permitted network
|
|
types.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The "Release channel" setting can be changed from the default Stable channel to the
|
|
Beta channel if you want to help with testing. The Beta channel will usually simply
|
|
follow the Stable channel, but the Beta channel may be used to experiment with new
|
|
features.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The "Permitted networks" setting controls which networks will be used to perform
|
|
updates. It defaults to using any network connection. It can be set to "Non-roaming"
|
|
to disable it when the cellular service is marked as roaming or "Unmetered" to disable
|
|
it on cellular networks and also Wi-Fi networks marked as metered.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The "Require battery above warning level" setting controls whether updates will
|
|
only be performed when the battery is above the level where the warning message is
|
|
shown. The standard value is at 15% capacity.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The "Require device to be charging" setting controls whether updates will
|
|
only be performed when the device is charging.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Enabling the opt-in "Automatic reboot" setting allows the updater to reboot the
|
|
device after an update once it has been idle for a long time. When this setting is
|
|
enabled, a device can take care of any number of updates completely automatically even
|
|
if it's left completely idle.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The "Notification settings" option is a shortcut to the System Updater notification
|
|
settings which allows you to control notification settings from System Updater such as
|
|
notification dot, lock screen, and noisy / silent notifications. These notifications
|
|
include updater errors, progress, already up to date, and reboot prompts. By default all
|
|
notifications are enabled.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="updates-security">
|
|
<h3><a href="#updates-security">Security</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>The update server isn't a trusted party since updates are signed and verified along
|
|
with downgrade attacks being prevented. The update protocol doesn't send identifiable
|
|
information to the update server and works well over a VPN / Tor. GrapheneOS isn't
|
|
able to comply with a government order to build, sign and ship a malicious update to a
|
|
specific user's device based on information like the IMEI, serial number, etc. The
|
|
update server only ends up knowing the IP address used to connect to it and the
|
|
version being upgraded from based on the requested incremental.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Android updates can support serialno constraints to make them validate only on a
|
|
certain device but GrapheneOS rejects any update with a serialno constraint for both
|
|
over-the-air updates (Updater app) and sideloaded updates (recovery).</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="updates-disabling">
|
|
<h3><a href="#updates-disabling">Disabling</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>It's highly recommended to leave automatic updates enabled and to configure
|
|
the permitted networks if the bandwidth usage is a problem on your mobile data
|
|
connection. However, it's possible to turn off the update client by going to
|
|
<b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span> Apps</b>, enabling Show
|
|
system via the menu, selecting System Updater and disabling the app. If you do
|
|
this, you'll need to remember to enable it again to start receiving updates.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="updates-sideloading">
|
|
<h3><a href="#updates-sideloading">Sideloading</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>Updates can be downloaded via
|
|
<a href="/releases">the releases page</a> and installed via recovery
|
|
with adb sideloading. The zip files are signed and verified by recovery, just as they
|
|
are by the update client within the OS. This includes providing downgrade protection,
|
|
which prevents attempting to downgrade the version. If recovery didn't enforce these
|
|
things, they would still be enforced via verified boot including downgrade protection
|
|
and the attempted update would just fail to boot and be rolled back.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>To install one by sideloading, first, boot into recovery. You may do this either by
|
|
using <code>adb reboot recovery</code> from the operating system, or by selecting the
|
|
"Recovery" option in the bootloader interface.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>You should see the green Android lying on its back being repaired, with the text "No
|
|
command" meaning that no command has been passed to recovery.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Next, access the recovery menu by holding down the power button and pressing the volume
|
|
up button a single time. This key combination toggles between the GUI and text-based mode
|
|
with the menu and log output.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Finally, select the "Apply update from ADB" option in the recovery menu and
|
|
sideload the update with adb. For example:</p>
|
|
|
|
<pre>adb sideload raven-ota_update-2021122018.zip</pre>
|
|
|
|
<p><strong>You do not need to have adb enabled within the OS or the host's ADB key
|
|
whitelisted within the OS to sideload an update to recovery. Recovery mode does not
|
|
trust the attached computer and this can be considered a production feature. Trusting
|
|
a computer with ADB access within the OS is much different and exposes the device to a
|
|
huge amount of attack surface and control by the trusted computer.</strong></p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control">
|
|
<h2><a href="#usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control">USB-C port and pogo pins control</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>Our <b>USB-C port and pogo pins</b> setting protects against attacks through
|
|
USB-C or pogo pins while the OS is booted. For the majority of devices without pogo
|
|
pins, the setting is labelled <b>USB-C port</b>.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The setting is available in <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Security <span aria-label="and then">></span> Exploit protection</b>.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The setting has five modes:</p>
|
|
|
|
<ul>
|
|
<li>Off</li>
|
|
<li>Charging-only</li>
|
|
<li>Charging-only when locked</li>
|
|
<li>Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock</li>
|
|
<li>On</li>
|
|
</ul>
|
|
|
|
<p>The default is <b>Charging-only when locked</b>, which significantly reduces
|
|
attack surface when the device is locked. After locking, it blocks any new USB
|
|
connections immediately and disables USB data once any current connections end.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>For technical details on how this feature works using a combination of hardware
|
|
and software protection, see the <a href="/features#usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control">section
|
|
on the features page</a>.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="web-browsing">
|
|
<h2><a href="#web-browsing">Web browsing</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS includes our Vanadium subproject providing privacy and security
|
|
enhanced releases of Chromium. Vanadium is both the user-facing browser included
|
|
in the OS and the provider of the WebView used by other apps to render web
|
|
content. The WebView is the browser engine used by nearly all other apps embedding
|
|
web content or using web technologies for other uses. It's also used by many minor
|
|
web browsers not forking Chromium as a whole. These apps using the WebView benefit
|
|
from a subset of the Vanadium hardening.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Vanadium was previously primarily focused on security hardening but we plan on
|
|
adding assorted privacy and usability features. In the near future, we plan to add
|
|
support for always incognito mode, improved state partitioning, backup/restore
|
|
and many other features.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Chromium-based browsers like Vanadium provide the strongest sandbox
|
|
implementation, leagues ahead of the alternatives. It is much harder to escape
|
|
from the sandbox and it provides much more than acting as a barrier to
|
|
compromising the rest of the OS. Site isolation enforces security boundaries
|
|
around each site using the sandbox by placing each site into an isolated sandbox.
|
|
It required a huge overhaul of the browser since it has to enforce these rules on
|
|
all the IPC APIs. Site isolation is important even without a compromise, due to
|
|
side channels. Browsers without site isolation are very vulnerable to attacks like
|
|
Spectre. On mobile, due to the lack of memory available to apps, there are
|
|
different modes for site isolation. Vanadium turns on strict site isolation,
|
|
matching Chromium on the desktop, along with strict origin isolation.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Chromium has decent exploit mitigations, unlike the available alternatives.
|
|
This is improved upon in Vanadium by enabling further mitigations, including those
|
|
developed upstream but not yet fully enabled due to code size, memory usage or
|
|
performance. For example, it enables type-based CFI like Chromium on the desktop,
|
|
uses a stronger SSP configuration, zero initializes variables by default, etc.
|
|
Some of the mitigations are inherited from the OS itself, which also applies to
|
|
other browsers, at least if they don't do things to break them.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>We recommend against trying to achieve browser privacy and security through
|
|
piling on browser extensions and modifications. Most privacy features for browsers
|
|
are privacy theater without a clear threat model and these features often reduce
|
|
privacy by aiding fingerprinting and adding more state shared between sites. Every
|
|
change you make results in you standing out from the crowd and generally provides
|
|
more ways to track you. Enumerating badness via content filtering is not a viable
|
|
approach to achieving decent privacy, just as AntiVirus isn't a viable way to
|
|
achieving decent security. These are losing battles, and are at best a stopgap
|
|
reducing exposure while waiting for real privacy and security features.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Vanadium will be following the school of thought where hiding the IP address
|
|
through Tor or a trusted VPN shared between many users is the essential baseline,
|
|
with the browser partitioning state based on site and mitigating fingerprinting to
|
|
avoid that being trivially bypassed. The Tor Browser's approach is the only one
|
|
with any real potential, however flawed the current implementation may be. This
|
|
work is currently in a very early stage and it is largely being implemented
|
|
upstream with the strongest available implementation of state partitioning.
|
|
Chromium is using Network Isolation Keys to divide up connection pools, caches and
|
|
other state based on site and this will be the foundation for privacy. Chromium
|
|
itself aims to prevent tracking through mechanisms other than cookies, greatly
|
|
narrowing the scope downstream work needs to cover. The focus is currently on
|
|
research since we don't see much benefit in deploying bits and pieces of this
|
|
before everything is ready to come together. At the moment, the only browser with
|
|
any semblance of privacy is the Tor Browser but there are many ways to bypass the
|
|
anti-fingerprinting and state partitioning. The Tor Browser's security is weak
|
|
which makes the privacy protection weak. The need to avoid diversity
|
|
(fingerprinting) creates a monoculture for the most interesting targets. This
|
|
needs to change, especially since Tor itself makes people into much more of a
|
|
target (both locally and by the exit nodes).</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>WebView-based browsers use the hardened Vanadium rendering engine, but they can't
|
|
offer as much privacy and control due to being limited to the capabilities supported
|
|
by the WebView widget. For example, they can't provide a setting for toggling sensors
|
|
access because the feature is fairly new and the WebView WebSettings API doesn't yet
|
|
include support for it as it does for JavaScript, location, cookies, DOM storage and
|
|
other older features. For sensors, the Sensors app permission added by GrapheneOS can
|
|
be toggled off for the browser app as a whole instead. The WebView sandbox also
|
|
currently runs every instance within the same sandbox and doesn't support site
|
|
isolation.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Avoid Gecko-based browsers like Firefox as they're currently much more vulnerable
|
|
to exploitation and inherently add a huge amount of attack surface. Gecko doesn't have
|
|
a WebView implementation (GeckoView is not a WebView implementation), so it has to be
|
|
used alongside the Chromium-based WebView rather than instead of Chromium, which means
|
|
having the remote attack surface of two separate browser engines instead of only one.
|
|
Firefox / Gecko also bypass or cripple a fair bit of the upstream and GrapheneOS
|
|
hardening work for apps. Worst of all, Firefox does not have internal sandboxing
|
|
on Android. This is despite the fact that Chromium semantic sandbox layer on
|
|
Android is implemented via the OS <code>isolatedProcess</code> feature, which is a
|
|
very easy to use boolean property for app service processes to provide strong
|
|
isolation with only the ability to communicate with the app running them via the
|
|
standard service API. Even in the desktop version, Firefox's sandbox is still
|
|
substantially weaker (especially on Linux) and lacks full support for isolating
|
|
sites from each other rather than only containing content as a whole. The sandbox
|
|
has been gradually improving on the desktop but it isn't happening for their
|
|
Android browser yet.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="camera">
|
|
<h2><a href="#camera">Camera</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS has the same camera capabilities and quality as the stock OS. It
|
|
will match the stock OS when comparing the same app on each OS. GrapheneOS uses
|
|
our own modern Camera app rather than the standard AOSP Camera app. GrapheneOS
|
|
Camera is far better than any of the portable open source camera alternatives and
|
|
even most proprietary camera apps including paid apps. On Pixels, Pixel Camera
|
|
can be used as an alternative with more features. The section below has a detailed
|
|
guide on using GrapheneOS Camera and the following section explains the remaining
|
|
advantages of Pixel Camera on Pixels.</p>
|
|
|
|
<section id="grapheneos-camera-app">
|
|
<h3><a href="#grapheneos-camera-app">GrapheneOS Camera app</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS includes our own modern camera app focused on privacy and
|
|
security. It includes modes for capturing images, videos and QR / barcode
|
|
scanning along with additional modes based on CameraX vendor extensions
|
|
(Portrait, HDR, Night, Face Retouch and Auto) on <a
|
|
href="https://developer.android.com/training/camera/supported-devices">devices
|
|
where they're available</a> (Pixels currently only have support for Night mode).</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Modes are displayed as tabs at the bottom of the screen. You can switch
|
|
between modes using the tab interface or by swiping left/right anywhere on the
|
|
screen. The arrow button at the top of the screen opens the settings panel and
|
|
you can close it by pressing anywhere outside the settings panel. You can also
|
|
swipe down to open the settings and swipe up to close it. Outside of the QR
|
|
scanning mode, there's a row of large buttons above the tab bar for switching
|
|
between the cameras (left), capturing images and starting/stopping video
|
|
recording (middle) and opening the gallery (right). The volume keys can also
|
|
be used as an equivalent to pressing the capture button. While recording a
|
|
video, the gallery button becomes an image capture button for capturing
|
|
images.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Our Camera app provides the system media intents used by other apps to
|
|
capture images / record videos via the OS provided camera implementation.
|
|
These intents can only be provided by a system app since Android 11, so the
|
|
quality of the system camera is quite important.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The app has an in-app gallery and video player for images/videos taken with
|
|
it. It currently opens an external editor activity for the edit action.
|
|
GrapheneOS comes with AOSP Gallery which provides an editor activity. You can
|
|
install a nicer photo editor and the Camera app will be able to use it. We
|
|
plan to replace AOSP Gallery with a standalone variant of the gallery we're
|
|
developing for the Camera app in the future.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Using the default 4:3 aspect ratio for image capture is recommended since
|
|
16:9 is simply cropped output on all supported devices. A device oriented
|
|
towards video recording might actually have a wider image sensor but that's
|
|
not the case for Pixels or nearly any other smartphone.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Image capture uses lightweight HDR+ on all supported Pixels and HDRnet for the
|
|
preview on 5th generation Pixels. Using the torch or camera flash will result
|
|
in HDR+ being disabled which is why automatic flash isn't enabled by default.
|
|
The lightweight HDR+ doesn't use as many frames as the more aggressive Pixel
|
|
Camera HDR+. CameraX extensions will eventually provide support for an HDR
|
|
mode with more aggressive HDR+ taking/combining more than only around 3 frames.
|
|
It currently supports a Night mode providing the Night Sight variant of HDR+ inflating
|
|
the light of the scene through combining the frames. Other fancy features like
|
|
Portrait mode will also depend on CameraX extensions being provided in the
|
|
future. There isn't a timeline for when additional CameraX extensions will be added.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Zooming via pinch to zoom or the zoom slider will automatically make use of
|
|
the wide angle and telephoto cameras on Pixels. 5th and 6th generation Pixels
|
|
(4a (5G), 5, 5a, 6, 6 Pro) have a wide angle camera for zooming out to under
|
|
1x to capture a much wider field of view. Images taken with the wide angle
|
|
lens won't match the quality of the normal camera, especially with 6th
|
|
generation Pixels. Flagship 4th generation Pixels (4, 4 XL) have a telephoto
|
|
camera providing 2x optical zoom and the Pixel 6 Pro has one providing 4x
|
|
optical zoom.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>By default, continuous auto focus, auto exposure and auto white balance are
|
|
used across the whole scene. Tapping to focus will switch to auto focus, auto
|
|
exposure and auto white balance based on that location. The focus timeout
|
|
setting determines the timeout before it switches back the default mode. The
|
|
exposure compensation slider on the left allows manually tuning exposure and
|
|
will automatically adjust shutter speed, aperture and ISO without disrupting
|
|
lightweight HDR+ support. Further configuration / tuning will be provided in
|
|
the future.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The QR scanning mode only scans within the scanning square marked on the
|
|
screen. The QR code should be aligned with the edges of the square but can
|
|
have any 90 degree orientation. Non-standard inverted QR codes are fully
|
|
supported. It's a very quick and high quality QR scanner able to easily scan
|
|
very high density QR codes from Pixels. Every 2 seconds, it will refresh auto
|
|
focus, auto exposure and auto white balance on the scanning square. It has
|
|
full support for zooming in and out. The torch can be toggled with the button
|
|
at the bottom center. The auto toggle at the bottom left can be used to toggle
|
|
scanning for all supported barcode types. Alternatively, you can select which
|
|
barcode types it should scan via the menu at the top. It only scans QR codes
|
|
by default since that provides quick and reliable scanning. Most other types
|
|
of barcodes can result in false positives. Each enabled type will slow down
|
|
the scanning and will make it more prone to false positives especially with
|
|
difficult to scan barcodes such as a dense QR code.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Camera permission is the only one that's required. Images and videos are
|
|
stored via the Media Store API so media/storage permissions aren't required.
|
|
The Microphone permission is needed for video recording by default but not
|
|
when including audio is disabled. Location permission is only needed if you
|
|
explicitly enabling location tagging, which is an experimental feature.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>By default, EXIF metadata is stripped for captured images and only includes
|
|
the orientation. Stripping metadata for videos is planned but not supported
|
|
yet. Orientation metadata isn't stripped since it's fully visible from how the
|
|
image is displayed so it doesn't count as hidden metadata and is needed for
|
|
proper display. You can toggle off stripping EXIF metadata in the More
|
|
Settings menu opened from the settings dialog. Disabling metadata stripping
|
|
will leave the timestamp, phone model, exposure configuration and other
|
|
metadata. Location tagging is disabled by default and won't be stripped if you
|
|
enable it.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Electronic Image Stabilization (EIS) is enabled by default on devices
|
|
providing it via the Camera2 API and can be disabled using the video settings
|
|
dialog.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Zero Shutter Lag (ZSL) is available as an opt-in toggle in More Settings
|
|
and speeds up image capture for the Camera mode when flash is disabled.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="pixel-camera">
|
|
<h3><a href="#pixel-camera">Pixel Camera</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>Pixel Camera (previously known as Google Camera) can take full advantage of the
|
|
available cameras and image processing hardware as it can on the stock OS and does
|
|
not require GSF or sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS. Direct TPU and GXP access
|
|
by Google apps including Pixel Camera is controlled by a toggle added by GrapheneOS
|
|
and doesn't provide them with any additional access to data. The toggle exists for
|
|
attack surface reduction. Every app can use the TPU and GXP via standard APIs
|
|
including the Android Neural Networks API and Camera2 API regardless.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>We aim to reduce the benefits of Pixel Camera compared to GrapheneOS
|
|
Camera over time, especially on Pixels. Many features of Pixel Camera will
|
|
end up being available for GrapheneOS Camera in the next year or so via
|
|
CameraX extensions including more aggressive HDR+, Night Sight and Portrait.
|
|
Video features such as slow motion and time lapse are likely further away than
|
|
within the next year. These video features could potentially be provided via
|
|
CameraX vendor extensions or could be implemented via our own post-processing
|
|
of the video output. Panorama, Photo Sphere, Astrophotography, Motion Photos,
|
|
Frequent Faces, Dual Exposure Controls, Google Lens, etc. aren't on the
|
|
roadmap for GrapheneOS Camera. Video frame rate configuration and H.265
|
|
support should be available for GrapheneOS Camera in the near future via
|
|
CameraX improvements along with DNG (RAW) support in the further future.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="exec-spawning">
|
|
<h2><a href="#exec-spawning">Exec spawning</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS creates fresh processes (via exec) when spawning applications instead of
|
|
using the traditional Zygote spawning model. This improves privacy and security at the
|
|
expense of higher cold start app spawning time and higher initial memory usage. It
|
|
doesn't impact runtime performance beyond the initial spawning time. It adds somewhere
|
|
in the ballpark of 200ms to app spawning time on the flagship devices and is only very
|
|
noticeable on lower-end devices with a weaker CPU and slower storage. The spawning
|
|
time impact only applies when the app doesn't already have an app process and the OS
|
|
will try to keep app processes cached in the background until memory pressure forces
|
|
it to start killing them.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>In the typical Zygote model, a template app process is created during boot and
|
|
every app is spawned as a clone of it. This results in every app sharing the same
|
|
initial memory content and layout, including sharing secrets that are meant to be
|
|
randomized for each process. It saves time by reusing the initialization work. The
|
|
initial memory usage is reduced due to copy-on-write semantics resulting in memory
|
|
written only during initialization being shared between app processes.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The Zygote model weakens the security provided by features based on random secrets
|
|
including Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), stack canaries, heap canaries,
|
|
randomized heap layout and memory tags. It cripples these security features since
|
|
every app has the values for every other app and the values don't change for fresh app
|
|
processes until reboot. Much of the OS itself is implemented via non-user-facing apps
|
|
with privileges reserved for OS components. The Zygote template is reused across user
|
|
profiles, so it also provides a temporary set of device identifiers across profiles
|
|
for each boot via the shared randomized values.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>This feature can be disabled via <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Security & privacy <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Exploit protection <span aria-label="and then">></span> Secure app spawning</b>
|
|
if you prefer to have faster cold start app spawning time and lower app process
|
|
memory usage instead of the substantial security benefits and the removal of the
|
|
only known remaining direct device identifiers across profiles (i.e. not depending
|
|
on fingerprinting global configuration, available storage space, etc. or using side
|
|
channels).</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="bugs-uncovered-by-security-features">
|
|
<h2><a href="#bugs-uncovered-by-security-features">Bugs uncovered by security features</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS substantially expands the standard mitigations for memory corruption
|
|
vulnerabilities. Some of these features are designed to directly catch the memory
|
|
corruption bugs either via an explicit check or memory protection and abort the
|
|
program in order to prevent them from being exploited. Other features mitigate issues
|
|
a bit less directly such as zeroing data immediately upon free, isolated memory
|
|
regions, heap randomization, etc. and can also lead to latent memory corruption bugs
|
|
crashing instead of the program continuing onwards with corrupted memory. This means
|
|
that many latent memory corruption bugs in apps are caught along with some in the OS
|
|
itself. These bugs are not caused by GrapheneOS, but rather already existed and are
|
|
uncovered by the features. The features are aimed at preventing or hindering exploits,
|
|
not finding bugs, but they do that as part of doing their actual job.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Similarly, some of the other privacy and security improvements reduce the access
|
|
available to applications and they may crash. Some of these features are always
|
|
enabled under the hood, while others like the Network and Sensors toggles are
|
|
controlled by users via opt-in or opt-out toggles. Apps may not handle having access
|
|
taken away like this, although it generally doesn't cause any issues as it's all
|
|
designed to be friendly to apps and fully compatible rather than killing the
|
|
application when it violates the rules.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>You can enable our exploit protection compatibility mode via
|
|
<b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span> Apps <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> <var>APP</var> <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Exploit protection compatibility mode</b>. The exploit protection compatibility mode
|
|
toggle will:</p>
|
|
<ul>
|
|
<li>Switch from hardened_malloc to Android's standard allocator (Scudo)</li>
|
|
<li>Reduce address space size from 48 bit to Android's standard 39 bit</li>
|
|
<li>Disable memory tagging, unless the app has opted-in to it (only on
|
|
compatible devices)</li>
|
|
<li>Allow native debugging (ptrace) access</li>
|
|
</ul>
|
|
|
|
<p>All of these changes apply only to the selected app and can be toggled separately.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>If you run into an application aborting, try to come up with a process for
|
|
reproducing the issue and then capture a bug report via the 'Take bug report'
|
|
feature in Developer options. Report an issue to <a
|
|
href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues">the GrapheneOS OS
|
|
issue tracker</a> and email the bug report capture zip to <a
|
|
href="mailto:contact@grapheneos.org">contact@grapheneos.org</a> with the
|
|
issue tracker number in the subject like "Bug report capture for issue
|
|
#104". The bug report capture includes plain text 'tombstones' with logs,
|
|
tracebacks, address space layout, register content and a tiny bit of context
|
|
from memory from areas that are interesting for debugging. This may contain
|
|
some sensitive data. Feel free to provide only the tombstone for the relevant
|
|
crash and filter out information you don't want to send. However, it will be
|
|
more difficult to debug if you provide less of the information. If the app
|
|
doesn't work with sensitive information, just send the whole tombstone.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="wifi-privacy">
|
|
<h2><a href="#wifi-privacy">Wi-Fi privacy</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>Wi-Fi on GrapheneOS is very privacy-friendly and is essentially anonymous as long
|
|
as apps do not leak uniquely identifying information to the network. GrapheneOS avoids
|
|
allowing itself to be fingerprinted as GrapheneOS, other than connections which are
|
|
documented (see the <a href="/faq#default-connections">default connections FAQ</a>)
|
|
and can be easily disabled or forced through a VPN service.</p>
|
|
|
|
<section id="wifi-privacy-scanning">
|
|
<h3><a href="#wifi-privacy-scanning">Scanning</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>MAC randomization is always performed for Wi-Fi scanning. Pixel
|
|
phones have firmware support for scanning MAC randomization going
|
|
<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/changes-to-device-identifiers-in.html">significantly beyond a naive implementation</a>.
|
|
On many other devices, there are identifiers exposed by Wi-Fi scanning beyond the MAC
|
|
address such as the packet sequence number and assorted identifying information in the
|
|
probe requests.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Avoid using hidden APs (i.e. APs not broadcasting their SSID) since all
|
|
known hidden SSIDs end up being broadcast as part of scanning for networks to
|
|
find them again. SSIDs are not broadcast for standard non-hidden APs. Hidden
|
|
APs are only hidden when no devices are connected. It makes little sense as a
|
|
privacy feature, especially for a non-mobile AP where knowing the AP exists
|
|
can't be used for tracking it since it doesn't move. The feature reduces your
|
|
privacy rather than increasing it. If you need to use a hidden AP, make sure
|
|
to delete the saved network afterwards.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Wi-Fi and Bluetooth scanning for improving location detection are disabled by
|
|
default, unlike the stock OS. These can be toggled in <b>Settings <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Location <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Location services <span aria-label="and then">></span> Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
|
|
scanning</b>. These features enable scanning even when Wi-Fi or Bluetooth is
|
|
disabled, so these need to be kept disabled to fully disable the radios when
|
|
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are disabled. GrapheneOS itself doesn't currently include a
|
|
supplementary location service based on Wi-Fi and Bluetooth scanning. These
|
|
options impact whether apps such as sandboxed Google Play are able to use the
|
|
functionality if you grant them the Location permission. GrapheneOS plans to
|
|
eventually include an OS service based on local databases rather than a
|
|
network-based service giving the user's location to a server whenever location
|
|
is being used.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="wifi-privacy-associated">
|
|
<h3><a href="#wifi-privacy-associated">Associated with an Access Point (AP)</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>Associated MAC randomization is performed by default. This can be controlled
|
|
per-network in <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span> Network
|
|
& internet <span aria-label="and then">></span> Internet <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> <var>NETWORK</var> <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Privacy</b>.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>In the stock OS, the default is to use a unique persistent random MAC address for
|
|
each network. It has 2 options available: "Use randomized MAC (default)" and "Use
|
|
device MAC". In GrapheneOS, the default is generating a new random MAC address when
|
|
connecting to a network. It has 3 options available: "Use per-connection randomized MAC
|
|
(default)", "Use per-network randomized MAC" and "Use device MAC".</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>In rare cases, broken routers are unable to accept new clients once their
|
|
DHCP table is full instead of clearing the last recently used entry. You can
|
|
work around this by manually clearing the DHCP table via the router
|
|
administration page and can switch to the per-network randomized MAC mode to
|
|
avoid triggering the issue again. This would prevent a router being used in
|
|
any situation where many clients naturally come and go even without
|
|
per-connection MAC randomization and is not generally an issue for any modern
|
|
routers. Per-connection MAC randomization only makes it more likely to find a
|
|
one of the rare routers with this issue.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The DHCP client uses the anonymity profile rather than sending a hostname
|
|
so it doesn't compromise the privacy offered by MAC randomization. When the
|
|
per-connection MAC randomization added by GrapheneOS is being used, DHCP
|
|
client state is flushed before reconnecting to a network to avoid revealing
|
|
that it's likely the same device as before.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS also disables support for stable link-local IPv6 addresses, since these
|
|
have the potential to be used as identifiers. It's more sensible to use typical
|
|
link-local address generation based on the (randomized) MAC address since link-local
|
|
devices have access to both. As of Android 11, Android only uses stable link-local
|
|
privacy addresses when MAC randomization is disabled, so we no longer need to disable
|
|
the feature.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="lte-only-mode">
|
|
<h2><a href="#lte-only-mode">LTE-only mode</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>If you have a reliable LTE connection from your carrier, you can reduce attack
|
|
surface by disabling 2G, 3G and 5G connectivity in <b>Settings <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Network & internet <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
SIMs <span aria-label="and then">></span> <var>SIM</var> <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Preferred network type</b>. Traditional voice calls will only
|
|
work in the LTE-only mode if you have either an LTE connection and VoLTE (Voice over LTE) support or
|
|
a Wi-Fi connection and VoWi-Fi (Voice over Wi-Fi) support. VoLTE / VoWi-Fi works on GrapheneOS for
|
|
most carriers unless they restrict it to carrier phones. Some carriers may be missing VoWi-Fi due to
|
|
us not including their proprietary apps. Please note that AT&T users may see "5Ge" being used
|
|
when LTE Only mode is enabled as AT&T intentionally mislabel LTE services as "5Ge" to mislead
|
|
users.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>This feature is not intended to improve the confidentiality of traditional calls and
|
|
texts, but it might somewhat raise the bar for some forms of interception. It's not a
|
|
substitute for end-to-end encrypted calls / texts or even transport layer encryption.
|
|
LTE does provide basic network authentication / encryption, but it's for the network
|
|
itself. The intention of the LTE-only feature is only hardening against remote
|
|
exploitation by disabling an enormous amount of both legacy code (2G, 3G) and bleeding
|
|
edge code (5G).</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="sandboxed-google-play">
|
|
<h2><a href="#sandboxed-google-play">Sandboxed Google Play</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<!-- keep in sync with features.html since we aren't simply linking to
|
|
features.html to avoid people skipping this important explanation -->
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS has a compatibility layer providing the option to install and use
|
|
the official releases of Google Play in the standard app sandbox. Google Play
|
|
receives absolutely no special access or privileges on GrapheneOS as opposed to
|
|
bypassing the app sandbox and receiving a massive amount of highly privileged
|
|
access. Instead, the compatibility layer teaches it how to work within the full
|
|
app sandbox. It also isn't used as a backend for the OS services as it would be
|
|
elsewhere since GrapheneOS doesn't use Google Play even when it's installed.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Since the Google Play apps are simply regular apps on GrapheneOS, you install
|
|
them within a specific user or work profile and they're only available within that
|
|
profile. Only apps within the same profile can use it and they need to explicitly
|
|
choose to use it. It works the same way as any other app and has no special
|
|
capabilities. As with any other app, it can't access data of other apps and
|
|
requires explicit user consent to gain access to profile data or the standard
|
|
permissions. Apps within the same profile can communicate with mutual consent and
|
|
it's no different for sandboxed Google Play.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Sandboxed Google Play is close to being fully functional and provides near
|
|
complete compatibility with the app ecosystem depending on Google Play. Only a
|
|
small subset of privileged functionality which we haven't yet ported to different
|
|
approaches with our compatibility layer is unavailable. Some functionality is
|
|
inherently privileged and can't be provided as part of the compatibility
|
|
layer.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The vast majority of Play services functionality works perfectly including
|
|
dynamically downloaded / updated modules (dynamite modules) and functionality
|
|
provided by modular app components such as Google Play Games. By default, location
|
|
requests are rerouted to a reimplementation of the Play geolocation service
|
|
provided by GrapheneOS. You can disable rerouting and use the standard Play
|
|
services geolocation service instead if you want the Google network location
|
|
service and related features.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Our compatibility layer includes full support for the Play Store. Play Store
|
|
services are fully available including in-app purchases, Play Asset Delivery, Play
|
|
Feature Delivery and app / content license checks. It can install, update and
|
|
uninstall apps with the standard approach requiring that the user authorizes it as
|
|
an app source and consents to each action. It will use the standard Android 12+
|
|
unattended update feature to do automatic updates for apps where it was the last
|
|
installer.</p>
|
|
|
|
<section id="sandboxed-google-play-installation">
|
|
<h3><a href="#sandboxed-google-play-installation">Installation</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>The simplest approach is to only use the Owner user profile. Apps installed
|
|
in the Owner profile are sandboxed the same way as everywhere else and don't
|
|
receive any special access. If you want to choose which apps use Google Play
|
|
rather than making it available to all of them, install it in a separate user
|
|
or work profile for apps depending on Google Play. You could also do it the
|
|
other way around, but it makes more sense to try to use as much as possible
|
|
without Google Play rather than treating not using it as the exceptional
|
|
case.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>To install sandboxed Google Play, open our App Store, select Google Play
|
|
services and install it. This will install both Google Play services and Google
|
|
Play Store which are interdependent. Existing installs of sandboxed Google Play
|
|
from before Android 15 will also have Google Services Framework installed and it
|
|
shouldn't be removed.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>You can obtain updates to these apps from our app repository client or from
|
|
the Play Store. Updates through the Play Store usually arrive first.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>You should give a battery optimization exception to Google Play services
|
|
for features like push notifications to work properly in the background. It
|
|
isn't needed for the other 2 apps.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Signing in into a Google account is optional, unless you want to
|
|
use features depending on being signed into an account. For example, some apps
|
|
use Google account authentication instead of their accounts having a username
|
|
and password. The Play Store requires being signed into an account in order to
|
|
install apps or use in-app purchases. This is still true even for an alternate
|
|
frontend to the Play Store. Aurora Store still requires an account but fetches
|
|
shared account credentials from Aurora Store's service by default.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The Play Store provides many services used by apps including Play Asset
|
|
Delivery, Play Feature Delivery, in-app purchases and license checks for paid
|
|
apps. The Play Store app is also the most secure way to install and update apps
|
|
from the Play Store.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Our compatibility layer has support for Play Games Services which you can
|
|
obtain by installing Google Play Games from the Play Store. Many games on the
|
|
Play Store depend on having Google Play Games installed.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="sandboxed-google-play-configuration">
|
|
<h3><a href="#sandboxed-google-play-configuration">Configuration</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>The compatibility layer has a configuration menu available at
|
|
<b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span> Apps <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Sandboxed Google Play</b>.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>By default, apps using Google Play geolocation are redirected to our own
|
|
implementation on top of the standard OS geolocation service. You don't need to
|
|
grant any permissions to Google Play or change any settings for working location
|
|
in apps using Google Play geolocation due to our rerouting feature. If you want
|
|
to use Google's network location service to provide location estimates without
|
|
satellite reception, you can disable the "Reroute location requests to OS APIs"
|
|
toggle and grant what it requires to provide network location. You will need to
|
|
grant "Allow all the time" Location access to Google Play services along with
|
|
the Nearby Devices permission for it to have all the access it needs. You need
|
|
to use the "Google Location Accuracy" link from the sandboxed Google Play
|
|
configuration menu to access the Google Play services menu for opting into their
|
|
network location service, otherwise this is all pointless. It will send the
|
|
nearby Wi-Fi and cellular networks provided via the Location and Nearby Devices
|
|
permissions to their service to retrieve a location estimate. In order to fully
|
|
take advantage of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth scanning, you also need to enable the
|
|
scanning toggles in <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Location  <span aria-label="and then">></span> Location services</b> which
|
|
are disabled by default and control whether apps with the required permissions can
|
|
scan when Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are otherwise disabled.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Re-routing location to the OS geolocation service will use more power than
|
|
using the Google Play geolocation service since we do not provide a
|
|
network-based location service and implement it via GNSS / A-GPS only. In the
|
|
future, we plan on providing a pseudo-network geolocation service for the OS
|
|
by using a local database of cell towers, and the location redirection feature
|
|
can also make use of this future OS implementation for network location
|
|
requests once it's available.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The Google Location Accuracy and Google settings activities would normally
|
|
be integrated into the OS but we don't include any of the standard Google Play
|
|
integration so there needs to be an app providing a way to access them.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The menu also provides links to this usage guide, Play services system
|
|
settings, Play Store system settings and Google settings. The Play services and
|
|
Play Store system settings are only included for convenience since they can be
|
|
accessed the same way as any other app via <b>Settings <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Apps</b>.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="sandboxed-google-play-limitations">
|
|
<h3><a href="#sandboxed-google-play-limitations">Limitations</a></h3>
|
|
|
|
<p>Our compatibility layer has to be expanded on a case-by-case basis to teach
|
|
Play services to work as a regular app without any of the invasive access and
|
|
integration it expects. In many cases, it doesn't truly need the access or we
|
|
can teach it to use the regular approach available to a normal app. In some
|
|
cases, the functionality it offers fundamentally requires privileged access
|
|
and cannot be supported. For example, Android Auto cannot be supported by
|
|
default as part of the baseline compatibility layer, but is supported as an
|
|
extension of it with dedicated toggles for the functionality that's not
|
|
possible to implement another way. The same applies to other highly invasive
|
|
OS integration / control or privileged access to hardware. Our compatibility
|
|
layer is a very actively developed work in progress and most of the remaining
|
|
unavailable functionality is quickly becoming supported. In the future, we can
|
|
also support redirection for more APIs such as FIDO2 rather than only the
|
|
geolocation service.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Functionality depending on the OS integrating Play services and using it as
|
|
a backend is unavailable. An OS integrating Play uses it as the backend for OS
|
|
services such as geolocation. GrapheneOS never uses it as the backend/provider
|
|
for OS services. In cases such as text-to-speech (TTS) where the OS allows the
|
|
user to choose the provider, Play services can often be used. It's on a level
|
|
playing field with other apps on GrapheneOS.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section id="esim-support">
|
|
<h3><a href="#esim-support">eSIM support</a></h3>
|
|
<p>By default, GrapheneOS has always shipped with baseline support for eSIM,
|
|
where users can use any eSIMs installed previously on the device. However, in
|
|
order to manage and add eSIMs, proprietary Google functionality is needed. This
|
|
is fully disabled by default.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>eSIM support on GrapheneOS doesn't require any dependency on Google Play,
|
|
and never shares data to Google Play even when installed. It won't connect to a
|
|
Google service unless the carrier uses one themselves.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>eSIM support can be enabled in <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Network & internet <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
eSIM support</b>. The toggle is persistent across every boot.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Note that if the eSIM installation process does not progress past the
|
|
"Checking network info..." stage despite having a stable Internet connection,
|
|
you may need to call the USSD code <code>*#*#4636#*#*</code> and then enable
|
|
DSDS in the menu that is presented.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>If an eSIM locked with a PIN is used, it is recommended to leave the eSIM
|
|
support toggle enabled even after activating the eSIM. This will allow you to
|
|
disable the eSIM on the lockscreen in case the PIN is forgotten. If the eSIM
|
|
support toggle is disabled and the PIN is forgotten, there is no way to access the
|
|
device unless the PUK is provided.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="android-auto">
|
|
<h2><a href="#android-auto">Android Auto</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS provides an option to install and use the official releases of
|
|
Android Auto.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Android Auto requires privileged access in order to work. GrapheneOS uses
|
|
an extension of the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer to make Android
|
|
Auto work with a reduced level of privileges.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>To install Android Auto, use the GrapheneOS App Store. Android Auto
|
|
can't be installed through the Play Store or other app sources. Android Auto
|
|
depends on sandboxed Google Play, you'll be prompted to install it if it's not
|
|
already installed.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>After installation, Android Auto has to be set up from the <b>Settings <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Apps <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Sandboxed Google Play <span aria-label="and then">></span> Android Auto</b>
|
|
configuration screen, which contains permission toggles, links to related
|
|
configuration screens, configuration tips, and links to optional Android Auto
|
|
dependencies.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The permission toggles ask for a confirmation before turning on. The
|
|
confirmation popup explains what access each permission toggle provides.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>By default, Android Auto is not granted any kind of privileged access. It's
|
|
treated the same way other apps are treated.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>In order to work, Android Auto has to be granted baseline permissions for wired
|
|
or wireless Android Auto. Wired Android Auto requires far less access than wireless
|
|
Android Auto does. Baseline permissions are controlled by the "Allow permissions
|
|
for wired / wireless Android Auto" toggles.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>For some cars, baseline permissions for wireless Android Auto are needed even
|
|
when using wired Android Auto. Therefore, if wired Android Auto is unable to
|
|
connect to the car with only wired permissions granted, try granting wireless
|
|
permissions instead.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>To forward notifications from the device to the car, Android Auto has to be
|
|
allowed notification access. The notification access settings are linked below the
|
|
permission toggles.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>In order to show up in the Android Auto car interface, apps have to be installed
|
|
from the Play Store and include Android Auto support.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>See Google's <a href="https://support.google.com/androidauto/topic/6106969">
|
|
Android Auto Help</a> pages for further Android Auto setup steps and usage
|
|
instructions.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="banking-apps">
|
|
<h2><a href="#banking-apps">Banking apps</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>Banking apps are a particularly problematic class of apps for compatibility
|
|
with alternate operating systems. Some of these work fine with any GrapheneOS
|
|
configuration but most of them have extensive dependencies on Play services. For
|
|
many of these apps, it's enough to set up the GrapheneOS sandboxed Google Play
|
|
feature in the same profile. Unfortunately, there are further complications not
|
|
generally encountered with non-financial apps.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Many of these apps have their own crude anti-tampering mechanisms trying to
|
|
prevent inspecting or modifying the app in a weak attempt to hide their code and API
|
|
from security researchers. GrapheneOS allows users to disable <b>Native code
|
|
debugging</b> via a toggle in <b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Security & privacy <span aria-label="and then">></span> Exploit protection</b>
|
|
to improve the app sandbox and this can interfere with apps debugging their
|
|
own code to add a barrier to analyzing the app. You should try enabling this again if you've
|
|
disabled it and are encountering compatibility issues with these kinds of apps.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Banking apps are increasingly using Google's SafetyNet attestation service to
|
|
check the integrity and certification status of the operating system. GrapheneOS
|
|
passes the <code>basicIntegrity</code> check but isn't certified by Google so it
|
|
fails the <code>ctsProfileMatch</code> check. Most apps currently only enforce
|
|
weak software-based attestation which can be bypassed by spoofing what it checks.
|
|
GrapheneOS doesn't attempt to bypass the checks since it would be very fragile and
|
|
would repeatedly break as the checks are improved. Devices launched with Android 8
|
|
or later have hardware attestation support which cannot be bypassed without leaked
|
|
keys or serious vulnerabilities so the era of being able to bypass these checks by
|
|
spoofing results is coming to an end regardless.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>The hardware attestation feature is part of the Android Open Source Project and
|
|
is fully supported by GrapheneOS. SafetyNet attestation chooses to use it to
|
|
enforce using Google certified operating systems. However, app developers can use
|
|
it directly and permit other properly signed operating systems upholding the
|
|
security model. GrapheneOS has a
|
|
<a href="/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide">detailed guide</a> for app
|
|
developers on how to support GrapheneOS with the hardware attestation API. Direct
|
|
use of the hardware attestation API provides much higher assurance than using
|
|
SafetyNet so these apps have nothing to lose by using a more meaningful API and
|
|
supporting a more secure OS.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>A 3rd party community-sourced effort containing
|
|
<a href="https://privsec.dev/posts/android/banking-applications-compatibility-with-grapheneos/">banking
|
|
app compatibility</a> information is maintained by PrivSec.dev. GrapheneOS does
|
|
not make any guarantees regarding the list's validity.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="app-link-verification">
|
|
<h2><a href="#app-link-verification">App link verification</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>Android apps can declare associations with domains in order to handle those URLs
|
|
in the app automatically. For security reasons, app links are disabled by default to
|
|
prevent apps intercepting arbitrary URLs. First party apps associated with a domain
|
|
are expected to be authorized by the domain. Apps can ask for their app links to be
|
|
verified by the OS by marking them with <code>autoVerify</code> in their manifest.
|
|
The OS will securely confirm that the domain authorizes the app to handle the
|
|
domain's URLs. Users can also manually enable an app's link associations via
|
|
<b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span> Apps <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> <var>APP</var> <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Open by default <span aria-label="and then">></span> Add link</b>. Apps can ask
|
|
users to enable the associations and send them to this page in the Settings app.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>As an example, the first party YouTube app will have the app links verified by
|
|
the OS automatically while the NewPipe app requires manually enabling handling
|
|
links for YouTube and other sites.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Verification of app links by the OS is done by the Intent Filter Verification
|
|
Service system app. It will use an HTTPS GET request to fetch
|
|
<code>https://example.com/.well-known/assetlinks.json</code> in order to process a
|
|
request to verify that an app can handle <code>example.com</code> links. The app
|
|
needs to have their app id and signing keys authorized by the domain in order for
|
|
the verification to succeed.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>These network requests by the Intent Filter Verification Service to verify app
|
|
associations with domains are commonly confused for network requests made by the
|
|
apps. It's simply an HTTPS GET request without identifying information and doesn't
|
|
offer a communication channel with the app. Redirects won't be followed so there
|
|
will be a single request for each attempt to verify a domain.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>If you don't want automatic app link verification, you can disable the Network
|
|
permission added by GrapheneOS for the Intent Filter Verification Service system
|
|
app. In the future, we may provide a way to disable verification directly instead
|
|
of stopping it from working. It will make heavily throttled attempts to verify a
|
|
domain after the check failed which won't negatively impact battery life due to
|
|
the conservative JobScheduler-based implementation.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>For more details, see the
|
|
<a href="https://developer.android.com/training/app-links/verify-android-applinks">developer
|
|
documentation on app link verification</a>.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section id="carrier-functionality">
|
|
<h2><a href="#carrier-functionality">Carrier functionality</a></h2>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS aims to work with all carriers that are officially supported by
|
|
Google on the stock operating system on Pixel devices. Wi-Fi Calling, VoLTE,
|
|
Visual Voicemail, MMS, SMS, Calling and 5G (SA and NSA) all are supported, however
|
|
some functionality may not be usable due to Google not supporting carriers on the
|
|
stock OS officially or due to GrapheneOS not shipping proprietary apps required in
|
|
order for this functionality to work on some carriers. GrapheneOS extracts
|
|
CarrierConfigs, APNs, modem configurations, Visual Voicemail configurations and
|
|
MMS configurations from the stock operating system to ensure users get easy
|
|
carrier support that "just works".</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Please note that in some regions, LTE is referred to as 4G.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Generally 5G, SMS, MMS, Calls and VoLTE will work fine on GrapheneOS with
|
|
officially supported carriers by Google. Wi-Fi calling may vary due to a reliance
|
|
on proprietary Google apps which GrapheneOS does not ship.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>If you are having issues with Visual Voicemail, please be aware that AT&T
|
|
USA users are unable to use this feature currently due to a lack of AOSP support.
|
|
Other carriers are done on a best effort basis. We would suggest using <a
|
|
href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.android.dialer">Google
|
|
Dialer</a> with sandboxed Google Play if you are unable to get this feature
|
|
working.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>If you are having problems sending or receiving SMS/MMS messages, we suggest
|
|
that you perform the following steps:</p>
|
|
|
|
<ul>
|
|
<li>Deregister your phone number from <a href="https://selfsolve.apple.com/deregister-imessage/">Apple iMessage</a></li>
|
|
<li>Deregister your phone number from <a href="https://messages.google.com/disable-chat">Google Chat Features</a></li>
|
|
<li>Deregister your phone number from your carrier's RCS service (Not all carriers have this)</li>
|
|
</ul>
|
|
|
|
<p>If you continue to have problems despite following the instructions above or
|
|
you have another carrier related issue, we suggest that you perform the following
|
|
steps:</p>
|
|
|
|
<ul>
|
|
<li>Some carriers require you to explicitly opt in to use services such as Wi-Fi calling.
|
|
Consult your carrier's documentation on the process for this or contact them.</li>
|
|
<li><b>Reset Mobile Network Settings</b> in <b>Settings <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> System <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Reset options</b> and then reboot the device.</li>
|
|
<li>USA users only: You may need to request your carrier to enable CDMA-less mode if
|
|
you have issues.</li>
|
|
<li>Follow your carrier's instructions for setting up APNs, this can be found in
|
|
<b>Settings <span aria-label="and then">></span> Network &
|
|
internet <span aria-label="and then">></span> SIMs <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> <var>SIM</var> <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> Access Point Names</b></li>
|
|
<li>If calls do not work and you have <a href="#lte-only-mode">LTE-only mode</a> enabled,
|
|
try toggling it off. If "Allow 2G" is disabled, try toggling it back on. Your carrier
|
|
may not properly support VoLTE.</li>
|
|
<li>As a last resort you may need to ask your carrier for a replacement SIM card.</li>
|
|
</ul>
|
|
|
|
<p>Some carriers may restrict functionality, such as VoLTE, on imported Pixel
|
|
devices as they only whitelist the IMEI ranges of Pixel device SKUs which were sold
|
|
locally. You can check your SKU on GrapheneOS by going to <b>Settings <span
|
|
aria-label="and then">></span> About phone <span aria-label="and then">></span>
|
|
Model <span aria-label="and then">></span> Hardware SKU</b> and using the <a
|
|
href="https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/7158570">official Google
|
|
documentation</a>. You should check if such functionality works on the stock OS to troubleshoot.
|
|
It is not possible to change the IMEI on a production device and GrapheneOS cannot add support for
|
|
it since the hardware doesn't support it.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>Android 12 introduced support for the
|
|
<a href="https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads//TS.43-v11.0-Service-Entitlement-Configuration.pdf">GSMA
|
|
TS.43</a> standard where provisioning for VoLTE, VoNR and Wi-Fi calling may be
|
|
handled by Google Firebase. Currently it is very rare for carriers to be using
|
|
Firebase to handle this. It is unlikely, but technically possible, that with such
|
|
carriers you may be required to install sandboxed Google Play in order to obtain
|
|
the former mentioned functionality where the carrier has not implemented fallback
|
|
provisioning via SMS. Currently only US Cellular, Orange France, Cspire US,
|
|
and Cellcom US are using this standard.</p>
|
|
|
|
<p>GrapheneOS includes bypasses for carrier restrictions on APN editing, tethering
|
|
via USB, Ethernet, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi and the ability to disable 2G (only on 6th
|
|
generation Pixel devices onwards) actions which would not necessarily have been
|
|
possible on the stock operating system.</p>
|
|
</section>
|
|
</main>
|
|
{% include "footer.html" %}
|
|
</body>
|
|
</html>
|