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Browse Source 
Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
This commit is contained in:
Ophestra 2025-06-18 13:43:48 +09:00
parent 717771ae80
commit ef80b19f2f
Signed by: cat
SSH Key Fingerprint: SHA256:gQ67O0enBZ7UdZypgtspB2FDM1g3GVw8nX0XSdcFw8Q
6 changed files with 293 additions and 260 deletions
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12
acl/acl-update.c
View File

@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
#include "acl-update.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
#include <acl/libacl.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
int f_acl_update_file_by_uid(const char *path_p, uid_t uid, acl_perm_t *perms, size_t plen) {
int f_acl_update_file_by_uid(const char *path_p, uid_t uid, acl_perm_t *perms,
size_t plen) {
int ret = -1;
bool v;
int i;
@ -19,7 +20,8 @@ int f_acl_update_file_by_uid(const char *path_p, uid_t uid, acl_perm_t *perms, s
goto out;
// prune entries by uid
for (i = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &entry); i == 1; i = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_NEXT_ENTRY, &entry)) {
for (i = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &entry); i == 1;
i = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_NEXT_ENTRY, &entry)) {
if (acl_get_tag_type(entry, &tag_type) != 0)
return -1;
if (tag_type != ACL_USER)

3
acl/acl-update.h
View File

@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
#include <sys/acl.h>
int f_acl_update_file_by_uid(const char *path_p, uid_t uid, acl_perm_t *perms, size_t plen);
int f_acl_update_file_by_uid(const char *path_p, uid_t uid, acl_perm_t *perms,
size_t plen);

191
sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.c
View File

@ -1,20 +1,19 @@
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE // CLONE_NEWUSER
#define _GNU_SOURCE /* CLONE_NEWUSER */
#endif
#include "seccomp-build.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || \
(SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \
#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \
(SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR == 5 && SCMP_VER_MICRO < 1)
#error This package requires libseccomp >= v2.5.1
#endif
@ -27,15 +26,19 @@ struct f_syscall_act {
#define LEN(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
#define SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(ruleset) do { \
if (opts & F_VERBOSE) f_println("adding seccomp ruleset \"" #ruleset "\""); \
#define SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(ruleset) \
do { \
if (opts & F_VERBOSE) \
f_println("adding seccomp ruleset \"" #ruleset "\""); \
for (int i = 0; i < LEN(ruleset); i++) { \
assert(ruleset[i].m_errno == EPERM || ruleset[i].m_errno == ENOSYS); \
\
if (ruleset[i].arg) \
*ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), ruleset[i].syscall, 1, *ruleset[i].arg); \
*ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), \
ruleset[i].syscall, 1, *ruleset[i].arg); \
else \
*ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), ruleset[i].syscall, 0); \
*ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ruleset[i].m_errno), \
ruleset[i].syscall, 0); \
\
if (*ret_p == -EFAULT) { \
res = 4; \
@ -47,32 +50,33 @@ struct f_syscall_act {
} \
} while (0)
int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_filter_opts opts) {
int32_t res = 0; // refer to resErr for meaning
int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
f_filter_opts opts) {
int32_t res = 0; /* refer to resPrefix for message */
int allow_multiarch = opts & F_MULTIARCH;
int allowed_personality = PER_LINUX;
if (opts & F_LINUX32)
allowed_personality = PER_LINUX32;
// flatpak commit 4c3bf179e2e4a2a298cd1db1d045adaf3f564532
/* flatpak commit 4c3bf179e2e4a2a298cd1db1d045adaf3f564532 */
struct f_syscall_act deny_common[] = {
// Block dmesg
/* Block dmesg */
{SCMP_SYS(syslog), EPERM},
// Useless old syscall
/* Useless old syscall */
{SCMP_SYS(uselib), EPERM},
// Don't allow disabling accounting
/* Don't allow disabling accounting */
{SCMP_SYS(acct), EPERM},
// Don't allow reading current quota use
/* Don't allow reading current quota use */
{SCMP_SYS(quotactl), EPERM},
// Don't allow access to the kernel keyring
/* Don't allow access to the kernel keyring */
{SCMP_SYS(add_key), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(keyctl), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(request_key), EPERM},
// Scary VM/NUMA ops
/* Scary VM/NUMA ops */
{SCMP_SYS(move_pages), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(mbind), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(get_mempolicy), EPERM},
@ -80,9 +84,9 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
{SCMP_SYS(migrate_pages), EPERM},
};
// fortify: project-specific extensions
/* fortify: project-specific extensions */
struct f_syscall_act deny_common_ext[] = {
// system calls for changing the system clock
/* system calls for changing the system clock */
{SCMP_SYS(adjtimex), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(clock_adjtime64), EPERM},
@ -90,23 +94,23 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
{SCMP_SYS(clock_settime64), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(settimeofday), EPERM},
// loading and unloading of kernel modules
/* loading and unloading of kernel modules */
{SCMP_SYS(delete_module), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(finit_module), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(init_module), EPERM},
// system calls for rebooting and reboot preparation
/* system calls for rebooting and reboot preparation */
{SCMP_SYS(kexec_file_load), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(kexec_load), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(reboot), EPERM},
// system calls for enabling/disabling swap devices
/* system calls for enabling/disabling swap devices */
{SCMP_SYS(swapoff), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(swapon), EPERM},
};
struct f_syscall_act deny_ns[] = {
// Don't allow subnamespace setups:
/* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */
{SCMP_SYS(unshare), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(setns), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(mount), EPERM},
@ -115,24 +119,27 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
{SCMP_SYS(pivot_root), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(chroot), EPERM},
#if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__CRIS__)
// Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack
// and flags arguments are reversed so the flags come second
{SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
/* Architectures with CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS2: the child stack
* and flags arguments are reversed so the flags come second */
{SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM,
&SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
#else
// Normally the flags come first
{SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM, &SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
/* Normally the flags come first */
{SCMP_SYS(clone), EPERM,
&SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER)},
#endif
// seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether
// the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3().
// Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
// (CVE-2021-41133; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d)
/* seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether
* the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3().
* Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
* (CVE-2021-41133; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d)
*/
{SCMP_SYS(clone3), ENOSYS},
// New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no
// legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them
// rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous.
// (CVE-2021-41133)
/* New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no
* legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them
* rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous.
* (CVE-2021-41133) */
{SCMP_SYS(open_tree), ENOSYS},
{SCMP_SYS(move_mount), ENOSYS},
{SCMP_SYS(fsopen), ENOSYS},
@ -142,9 +149,9 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
{SCMP_SYS(mount_setattr), ENOSYS},
};
// fortify: project-specific extensions
/* fortify: project-specific extensions */
struct f_syscall_act deny_ns_ext[] = {
// changing file ownership
/* changing file ownership */
{SCMP_SYS(chown), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(chown32), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(fchown), EPERM},
@ -153,7 +160,7 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
{SCMP_SYS(lchown), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(lchown32), EPERM},
// system calls for changing user ID and group ID credentials
/* system calls for changing user ID and group ID credentials */
{SCMP_SYS(setgid), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(setgid32), EPERM},
{SCMP_SYS(setgroups), EPERM},
@ -171,33 +178,35 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
};
struct f_syscall_act deny_tty[] = {
// Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226)
{SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCSTI)},
// In the unlikely event that the controlling tty is a Linux virtual
// console (/dev/tty2 or similar), copy/paste operations have an effect
// similar to TIOCSTI (CVE-2023-28100)
{SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM, &SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCLINUX)},
/* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
{SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM,
&SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCSTI)},
/* In the unlikely event that the controlling tty is a Linux virtual
* console (/dev/tty2 or similar), copy/paste operations have an effect
* similar to TIOCSTI (CVE-2023-28100) */
{SCMP_SYS(ioctl), EPERM,
&SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFFu, (int)TIOCLINUX)},
};
struct f_syscall_act deny_devel[] = {
// Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside
// the sandbox. In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs.
/* Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside
* the sandbox. In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs. */
{SCMP_SYS(perf_event_open), EPERM},
// Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot
{SCMP_SYS(personality), EPERM, &SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)},
/* Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot */
{SCMP_SYS(personality), EPERM,
&SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_NE, allowed_personality)},
{SCMP_SYS(ptrace), EPERM}
};
{SCMP_SYS(ptrace), EPERM}};
struct f_syscall_act deny_emu[] = {
// modify_ldt is a historic source of interesting information leaks,
// so it's disabled as a hardening measure.
// However, it is required to run old 16-bit applications
// as well as some Wine patches, so it's allowed in multiarch.
/* modify_ldt is a historic source of interesting information leaks,
* so it's disabled as a hardening measure.
* However, it is required to run old 16-bit applications
* as well as some Wine patches, so it's allowed in multiarch. */
{SCMP_SYS(modify_ldt), EPERM},
};
// fortify: project-specific extensions
/* fortify: project-specific extensions */
struct f_syscall_act deny_emu_ext[] = {
{SCMP_SYS(subpage_prot), ENOSYS},
{SCMP_SYS(switch_endian), ENOSYS},
@ -205,13 +214,12 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
{SCMP_SYS(vm86old), ENOSYS},
};
// Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink
struct
{
/* Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */
struct {
int family;
f_filter_opts flags_mask;
} socket_family_allowlist[] = {
// NOTE: Keep in numerical order
/* NOTE: Keep in numerical order */
{AF_UNSPEC, 0},
{AF_LOCAL, 0},
{AF_INET, 0},
@ -228,14 +236,14 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
} else
errno = 0;
// We only really need to handle arches on multiarch systems.
// If only one arch is supported the default is fine
/* We only really need to handle arches on multiarch systems.
* If only one arch is supported the default is fine */
if (arch != 0) {
// This *adds* the target arch, instead of replacing the
// native one. This is not ideal, because we'd like to only
// allow the target arch, but we can't really disallow the
// native arch at this point, because then bubblewrap
// couldn't continue running.
/* This *adds* the target arch, instead of replacing the
* native one. This is not ideal, because we'd like to only
* allow the target arch, but we can't really disallow the
* native arch at this point, because then bubblewrap
* couldn't continue running. */
*ret_p = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, arch);
if (*ret_p < 0 && *ret_p != -EEXIST) {
res = 2;
@ -252,33 +260,44 @@ int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_
}
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_common);
if (opts & F_DENY_NS) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns);
if (opts & F_DENY_TTY) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_tty);
if (opts & F_DENY_DEVEL) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_devel);
if (!allow_multiarch) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu);
if (opts & F_DENY_NS)
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns);
if (opts & F_DENY_TTY)
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_tty);
if (opts & F_DENY_DEVEL)
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_devel);
if (!allow_multiarch)
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu);
if (opts & F_EXT) {
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_common_ext);
if (opts & F_DENY_NS) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns_ext);
if (!allow_multiarch) SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu_ext);
if (opts & F_DENY_NS)
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_ns_ext);
if (!allow_multiarch)
SECCOMP_RULESET_ADD(deny_emu_ext);
}
// Socket filtering doesn't work on e.g. i386, so ignore failures here
// However, we need to user seccomp_rule_add_exact to avoid libseccomp doing
// something else: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/8
/* Socket filtering doesn't work on e.g. i386, so ignore failures here
* However, we need to user seccomp_rule_add_exact to avoid libseccomp doing
* something else: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/8 */
int last_allowed_family = -1;
for (int i = 0; i < LEN(socket_family_allowlist); i++) {
if (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask != 0 &&
(socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask & opts) != socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask)
(socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask & opts) !=
socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask)
continue;
for (int disallowed = last_allowed_family + 1; disallowed < socket_family_allowlist[i].family; disallowed++) {
// Blocklist the in-between valid families
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, disallowed));
for (int disallowed = last_allowed_family + 1;
disallowed < socket_family_allowlist[i].family; disallowed++) {
/* Blocklist the in-between valid families */
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT),
SCMP_SYS(socket), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, disallowed));
}
last_allowed_family = socket_family_allowlist[i].family;
}
// Blocklist the rest
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1, SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GE, last_allowed_family + 1));
/* Blocklist the rest */
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GE, last_allowed_family + 1));
if (fd < 0) {
*ret_p = seccomp_load(ctx);

8
sandbox/seccomp/seccomp-build.h
View File

@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || \
(SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \
#if (SCMP_VER_MAJOR < 2) || (SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR < 5) || \
(SCMP_VER_MAJOR == 2 && SCMP_VER_MINOR == 5 && SCMP_VER_MICRO < 1)
#error This package requires libseccomp >= v2.5.1
#endif
@ -20,4 +19,5 @@ typedef enum {
} f_filter_opts;
extern void f_println(char *v);
int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch, f_filter_opts opts);
int32_t f_build_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch, uint32_t multiarch,
f_filter_opts opts);

32
sandbox/wl/wayland-bind.c
View File

@ -1,30 +1,36 @@
#include "wayland-bind.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <wayland-client.h>
#include "security-context-v1-protocol.h"
#include <wayland-client.h>
static void registry_handle_global(void *data, struct wl_registry *registry, uint32_t name, const char *interface, uint32_t version) {
static void registry_handle_global(void *data, struct wl_registry *registry,
uint32_t name, const char *interface,
uint32_t version) {
struct wp_security_context_manager_v1 **out = data;
if (strcmp(interface, wp_security_context_manager_v1_interface.name) == 0)
*out = wl_registry_bind(registry, name, &wp_security_context_manager_v1_interface, 1);
*out = wl_registry_bind(registry, name,
&wp_security_context_manager_v1_interface, 1);
}
static void registry_handle_global_remove(void *data, struct wl_registry *registry, uint32_t name) { } // no-op
static void registry_handle_global_remove(void *data,
struct wl_registry *registry,
uint32_t name) {} /* no-op */
static const struct wl_registry_listener registry_listener = {
.global = registry_handle_global,
.global_remove = registry_handle_global_remove,
};
int32_t f_bind_wayland_fd(char *socket_path, int fd, const char *app_id, const char *instance_id, int sync_fd) {
int32_t res = 0; // refer to resErr for meaning
int32_t f_bind_wayland_fd(char *socket_path, int fd, const char *app_id,
const char *instance_id, int sync_fd) {
int32_t res = 0; /* refer to resErr for corresponding Go error */
struct wl_display *display;
display = wl_display_connect_to_fd(fd);
@ -37,7 +43,8 @@ int32_t f_bind_wayland_fd(char *socket_path, int fd, const char *app_id, const c
registry = wl_display_get_registry(display);
struct wp_security_context_manager_v1 *security_context_manager = NULL;
wl_registry_add_listener(registry, &registry_listener, &security_context_manager);
wl_registry_add_listener(registry, &registry_listener,
&security_context_manager);
int ret;
ret = wl_display_roundtrip(display);
wl_registry_destroy(registry);
@ -64,8 +71,11 @@ int32_t f_bind_wayland_fd(char *socket_path, int fd, const char *app_id, const c
goto out;
struct wp_security_context_v1 *security_context;
security_context = wp_security_context_manager_v1_create_listener(security_context_manager, listen_fd, sync_fd);
wp_security_context_v1_set_sandbox_engine(security_context, "uk.gensokyo.fortify");
security_context = wp_security_context_manager_v1_create_listener(
security_context_manager, listen_fd, sync_fd);
wp_security_context_v1_set_sandbox_engine(security_context,
"uk.gensokyo.fortify");
wp_security_context_v1_set_app_id(security_context, app_id);
wp_security_context_v1_set_instance_id(security_context, instance_id);
wp_security_context_v1_commit(security_context);

3
sandbox/wl/wayland-bind.h
View File

@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
#include <stdint.h>
int32_t f_bind_wayland_fd(char *socket_path, int fd, const char *app_id, const char *instance_id, int sync_fd);
int32_t f_bind_wayland_fd(char *socket_path, int fd, const char *app_id,
const char *instance_id, int sync_fd);