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Author SHA1 Message Date
c1ff73b1b1
container: optionally isolate host abstract UNIX domain sockets via landlock
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2025-08-18 02:50:15 +09:00
551ec8c27d
app: set up acl on X11 socket
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The socket is typically owned by the priv-user, and inaccessible by the target user, so just allowing access to the directory is not enough. This change fixes this oversight and add checks that will also be useful for merging #1.

Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
2025-08-18 02:33:03 +09:00
19 changed files with 226 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ type appInfo struct {
// passed through to [hst.Config]
Net bool `json:"net,omitempty"`
// passed through to [hst.Config]
ScopeAbstract bool `json:"scope_abstract,omitempty"`
// passed through to [hst.Config]
Device bool `json:"dev,omitempty"`
// passed through to [hst.Config]
Tty bool `json:"tty,omitempty"`

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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"os"
"os/exec"
"runtime"
@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import (
. "syscall"
"time"
"hakurei.app/container/landlock"
"hakurei.app/container/seccomp"
)
@ -92,6 +94,8 @@ type (
RetainSession bool
// Do not [syscall.CLONE_NEWNET].
HostNet bool
// Scope abstract UNIX domain sockets using LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET.
ScopeAbstract bool
// Retain CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Privileged bool
}
@ -179,6 +183,12 @@ func (p *Container) Start() error {
p.wait = make(chan struct{})
done <- func() error { // setup depending on per-thread state must happen here
if p.ScopeAbstract {
if err := landlock.ScopeAbstract(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("could not scope abstract unix sockets: %v", err)
}
}
msg.Verbose("starting container init")
if err := p.cmd.Start(); err != nil {
return msg.WrapErr(err, err.Error())

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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
package landlock
/*
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
*/
import "C"
import (
"fmt"
"syscall"
"unsafe"
)
const (
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION = C.LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET = C.LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET
SYS_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET = C.SYS_landlock_create_ruleset
SYS_LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF = C.SYS_landlock_restrict_self
)
type LandlockRulesetAttr = C.struct_landlock_ruleset_attr
// ScopeAbstract calls landlock_restrict_self and must be called from a goroutine wired to an m
// with the process starting from the same goroutine.
func ScopeAbstract() error {
abi, _, err := syscall.Syscall(SYS_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET, 0, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)
if err != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("could not fetch landlock ABI: errno %v", err)
}
if abi < 6 {
return fmt.Errorf("landlock ABI must be >= 6, got %d", abi)
}
attrs := LandlockRulesetAttr{
scoped: LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
}
fd, _, err := syscall.Syscall(SYS_LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&attrs)), unsafe.Sizeof(attrs), 0)
if err != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("could not create landlock ruleset: errno %v", err)
}
defer syscall.Close(int(fd))
r, _, err := syscall.Syscall(SYS_LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF, fd, 0, 0)
if r != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("could not restrict self via landlock: errno %v", err)
}
return nil
}

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@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ type (
Userns bool `json:"userns,omitempty"`
// share host net namespace
Net bool `json:"net,omitempty"`
// disallow accessing abstract UNIX domain sockets created outside the container
ScopeAbstract bool `json:"scope_abstract,omitempty"`
// allow dangerous terminal I/O
Tty bool `json:"tty,omitempty"`
// allow multiarch

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@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ func newContainer(s *hst.ContainerConfig, os sys.State, prefix string, uid, gid
SeccompPresets: s.SeccompPresets,
RetainSession: s.Tty,
HostNet: s.Net,
ScopeAbstract: s.ScopeAbstract,
// the container is canceled when shim is requested to exit or receives an interrupt or termination signal;
// this behaviour is implemented in the shim

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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
"path"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
@ -390,6 +391,22 @@ func (seal *outcome) finalise(ctx context.Context, sys sys.State, config *hst.Co
seal.env[display] = d
socketDir := container.AbsFHSTmp.Append(".X11-unix")
seal.container.Bind(socketDir, socketDir, 0)
// the socket file at `/tmp/.X11-unix/X%d` is typically owned by the priv user
// and not accessible by the target user
var socketPath *container.Absolute
if len(d) > 1 && d[0] == ':' { // `:%d`
if n, err := strconv.Atoi(d[1:]); err == nil && n >= 0 {
socketPath = socketDir.Append("X" + strconv.Itoa(n))
}
} else if len(d) > 5 && strings.HasPrefix(d, "unix:") { // `unix:%s`
if a, err := container.NewAbs(d[5:]); err == nil {
socketPath = a
}
}
if socketPath != nil {
seal.sys.UpdatePermTypeOptional(system.EX11, socketPath.String(), acl.Read, acl.Write, acl.Execute)
}
}
}

View File

@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ in
multiarch
env
;
scope_abstract = app.scopeAbstract;
map_real_uid = app.mapRealUid;
filesystem =

View File

@ -572,6 +572,28 @@ boolean
*Example:*
` true `
## environment\.hakurei\.apps\.\<name>\.scopeAbstract
Whether to restrict abstract UNIX domain socket access\.
*Type:*
boolean
*Default:*
` true `
*Example:*
` true `

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@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ in
net = mkEnableOption "network access" // {
default = true;
};
scopeAbstract = mkEnableOption "abstract unix domain socket access" // {
default = true;
};
nix = mkEnableOption "nix daemon access";
mapRealUid = mkEnableOption "mapping to priv-user uid";

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@ -21,7 +21,17 @@ func (sys *I) UpdatePermType(et Enablement, path string, perms ...acl.Perm) *I {
sys.lock.Lock()
defer sys.lock.Unlock()
sys.ops = append(sys.ops, &ACL{et, path, perms})
sys.ops = append(sys.ops, &ACL{et, path, perms, false})
return sys
}
// UpdatePermTypeOptional appends an acl update Op that silently continues if the target does not exist.
func (sys *I) UpdatePermTypeOptional(et Enablement, path string, perms ...acl.Perm) *I {
sys.lock.Lock()
defer sys.lock.Unlock()
sys.ops = append(sys.ops, &ACL{et, path, perms, true})
return sys
}
@ -30,15 +40,25 @@ type ACL struct {
et Enablement
path string
perms acl.Perms
// since revert operations are cross-process, the success of apply must not affect the outcome of revert
skipNotExist bool
}
func (a *ACL) Type() Enablement { return a.et }
func (a *ACL) apply(sys *I) error {
msg.Verbose("applying ACL", a)
return wrapErrSuffix(acl.Update(a.path, sys.uid, a.perms...),
if err := acl.Update(a.path, sys.uid, a.perms...); err != nil {
if !a.skipNotExist || !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return wrapErrSuffix(err,
fmt.Sprintf("cannot apply ACL entry to %q:", a.path))
}
msg.Verbosef("path %q does not exist", a.path)
return nil
}
return nil
}
func (a *ACL) revert(sys *I, ec *Criteria) error {
if ec.hasType(a) {

View File

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ func TestUpdatePerm(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.path+permSubTestSuffix(tc.perms), func(t *testing.T) {
sys := New(150)
sys.UpdatePerm(tc.path, tc.perms...)
(&tcOp{Process, tc.path}).test(t, sys.ops, []Op{&ACL{Process, tc.path, tc.perms}}, "UpdatePerm")
(&tcOp{Process, tc.path}).test(t, sys.ops, []Op{&ACL{Process, tc.path, tc.perms, false}}, "UpdatePerm")
})
}
}
@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ func TestUpdatePermType(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(tc.path+"_"+TypeString(tc.et)+permSubTestSuffix(tc.perms), func(t *testing.T) {
sys := New(150)
sys.UpdatePermType(tc.et, tc.path, tc.perms...)
tc.test(t, sys.ops, []Op{&ACL{tc.et, tc.path, tc.perms}}, "UpdatePermType")
tc.test(t, sys.ops, []Op{&ACL{tc.et, tc.path, tc.perms, false}}, "UpdatePermType")
})
}
}

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@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ func (p *Proxy) Start() error {
argF, func(z *container.Container) {
z.SeccompFlags |= seccomp.AllowMultiarch
z.SeccompPresets |= seccomp.PresetStrict
// xdg-dbus-proxy requires host abstract UNIX domain socket access
z.ScopeAbstract = false
z.Hostname = "hakurei-dbus"
if p.output != nil {
z.Stdout, z.Stderr = p.output, p.output

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@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"io/fs"
"log"
"net"
"os"
"syscall"
)
@ -33,6 +34,10 @@ type TestCase struct {
FS *FS `json:"fs"`
Mount []*MountinfoEntry `json:"mount"`
Seccomp bool `json:"seccomp"`
TrySocket string `json:"try_socket,omitempty"`
SocketAbstract bool `json:"socket_abstract,omitempty"`
SocketPathname bool `json:"socket_pathname,omitempty"`
}
type T struct {
@ -125,6 +130,47 @@ func (t *T) MustCheck(want *TestCase) {
} else {
printf("[SKIP] skipping seccomp check")
}
if want.TrySocket != "" {
abstractConn, abstractErr := net.Dial("unix", "@"+want.TrySocket)
pathnameConn, pathnameErr := net.Dial("unix", want.TrySocket)
ok := true
if abstractErr == nil {
if err := abstractConn.Close(); err != nil {
ok = false
log.Printf("Close: %v", err)
}
}
if pathnameErr == nil {
if err := pathnameConn.Close(); err != nil {
ok = false
log.Printf("Close: %v", err)
}
}
abstractWantErr := error(syscall.EPERM)
pathnameWantErr := error(syscall.ENOENT)
if want.SocketAbstract {
abstractWantErr = nil
}
if want.SocketPathname {
pathnameWantErr = nil
}
if !errors.Is(abstractErr, abstractWantErr) {
ok = false
log.Printf("abstractErr: %v, want %v", abstractErr, abstractWantErr)
}
if !errors.Is(pathnameErr, pathnameWantErr) {
ok = false
log.Printf("pathnameErr: %v, want %v", pathnameErr, pathnameWantErr)
}
if !ok {
os.Exit(1)
}
}
}
func MustCheckFilter(pid int, want string) {

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@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ let
useCommonPaths
userns
;
enablements = {
inherit (tc) x11;
};
share = testProgram;
packages = [ ];
path = "${testProgram}/bin/hakurei-test";

View File

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ in
mapRealUid = false;
useCommonPaths = true;
userns = false;
x11 = true;
# 0, PresetStrict
expectedFilter = {
@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ in
want = {
env = [
"DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/65534/bus"
"DISPLAY=:0"
"HOME=/var/lib/hakurei/u0/a4"
"PULSE_SERVER=unix:/run/user/65534/pulse/native"
"SHELL=/run/current-system/sw/bin/bash"
@ -161,7 +163,9 @@ in
} null;
devices = fs "800001ed" null null;
} null;
tmp = fs "800001f8" { } null;
tmp = fs "800001f8" {
".X11-unix" = fs "801001ff" { X0 = fs "10001fd" null null; } null;
} null;
usr = fs "800001c0" { bin = fs "800001ed" { env = fs "80001ff" null null; } null; } null;
var = fs "800001c0" {
lib = fs "800001c0" {
@ -231,10 +235,15 @@ in
(ent ignore "/etc/passwd" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "tmpfs" "rootfs" "rw,uid=1000004,gid=1000004")
(ent ignore "/etc/group" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "tmpfs" "rootfs" "rw,uid=1000004,gid=1000004")
(ent ignore "/run/user/65534/wayland-0" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "ext4" "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos" "rw")
(ent "/tmp/.X11-unix" "/tmp/.X11-unix" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "ext4" "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos" "rw")
(ent ignore "/run/user/65534/pulse/native" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "tmpfs" "tmpfs" ignore)
(ent ignore "/run/user/65534/bus" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "ext4" "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos" "rw")
];
seccomp = true;
try_socket = "/tmp/.X11-unix/X0";
socket_abstract = false;
socket_pathname = true;
};
}

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@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ in
mapRealUid = true;
useCommonPaths = true;
userns = false;
x11 = false;
# 0, PresetStrict
expectedFilter = {
@ -266,5 +267,9 @@ in
];
seccomp = true;
try_socket = "/tmp/.X11-unix/X0";
socket_abstract = false;
socket_pathname = false;
};
}

View File

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ in
mapRealUid = false;
useCommonPaths = false;
userns = true;
x11 = false;
# 0, PresetExt | PresetDenyDevel
expectedFilter = {
@ -261,5 +262,9 @@ in
];
seccomp = true;
try_socket = "/tmp/.X11-unix/X0";
socket_abstract = false;
socket_pathname = false;
};
}

View File

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ in
mapRealUid = false;
useCommonPaths = false;
userns = false;
x11 = false;
# 0, PresetStrict
expectedFilter = {
@ -259,5 +260,9 @@ in
];
seccomp = true;
try_socket = "/tmp/.X11-unix/X0";
socket_abstract = false;
socket_pathname = false;
};
}

View File

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ in
mapRealUid = false;
useCommonPaths = true;
userns = false;
x11 = true;
# 0, PresetExt | PresetDenyNS | PresetDenyDevel
expectedFilter = {
@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ in
want = {
env = [
"DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=unix:path=/run/user/65534/bus"
"DISPLAY=:0"
"HOME=/var/lib/hakurei/u0/a2"
"PULSE_SERVER=unix:/run/user/65534/pulse/native"
"SHELL=/run/current-system/sw/bin/bash"
@ -188,7 +190,9 @@ in
} null;
devices = fs "800001ed" null null;
} null;
tmp = fs "800001f8" { } null;
tmp = fs "800001f8" {
".X11-unix" = fs "801001ff" { X0 = fs "10001fd" null null; } null;
} null;
usr = fs "800001c0" { bin = fs "800001ed" { env = fs "80001ff" null null; } null; } null;
var = fs "800001c0" {
lib = fs "800001c0" {
@ -263,10 +267,15 @@ in
(ent ignore "/etc/passwd" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "tmpfs" "rootfs" "rw,uid=1000002,gid=1000002")
(ent ignore "/etc/group" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "tmpfs" "rootfs" "rw,uid=1000002,gid=1000002")
(ent ignore "/run/user/65534/wayland-0" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "ext4" "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos" "rw")
(ent "/tmp/.X11-unix" "/tmp/.X11-unix" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "ext4" "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos" "rw")
(ent ignore "/run/user/65534/pulse/native" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "tmpfs" "tmpfs" ignore)
(ent ignore "/run/user/65534/bus" "ro,nosuid,nodev,relatime" "ext4" "/dev/disk/by-label/nixos" "rw")
];
seccomp = true;
try_socket = "/tmp/.X11-unix/X0";
socket_abstract = false;
socket_pathname = true;
};
}