package hst

import (
	"errors"
	"strconv"
	"strings"

	"hakurei.app/container/check"
)

// Config configures an application container, implemented in internal/app.
type Config struct {
	// Reverse-DNS style configured arbitrary identifier string.
	// Passed to wayland security-context-v1 and used as part of defaults in dbus session proxy.
	ID string `json:"id,omitempty"`

	// System services to make available in the container.
	Enablements *Enablements `json:"enablements,omitempty"`

	// Session D-Bus proxy configuration.
	// If set to nil, session bus proxy assume built-in defaults.
	SessionBus *BusConfig `json:"session_bus,omitempty"`
	// System D-Bus proxy configuration.
	// If set to nil, system bus proxy is disabled.
	SystemBus *BusConfig `json:"system_bus,omitempty"`

	// Direct access to wayland socket, no attempt is made to attach security-context-v1
	// and the bare socket is made available to the container.
	//
	// This option is unsupported and most likely enables full control over the Wayland
	// session. Do not set this to true unless you are sure you know what you are doing.
	DirectWayland bool `json:"direct_wayland,omitempty"`
	// Direct access to the PipeWire socket established via SecurityContext::Create, no
	// attempt is made to start the pipewire-pulse server.
	//
	// The SecurityContext machinery is fatally flawed, it blindly sets read and execute
	// bits on all objects for clients with the lowest achievable privilege level (by
	// setting PW_KEY_ACCESS to "restricted"). This enables them to call any method
	// targeting any object, and since Registry::Destroy checks for the read and execute bit,
	// allows the destruction of any object other than PW_ID_CORE as well. This behaviour
	// is implemented separately in media-session and wireplumber, with the wireplumber
	// implementation in Lua via an embedded Lua vm. In all known setups, wireplumber is
	// in use, and there is no known way to change its behaviour and set permissions
	// differently without replacing the Lua script. Also, since PipeWire relies on these
	// permissions to work, reducing them is not possible.
	//
	// Currently, the only other sandboxed use case is flatpak, which is not aware of
	// PipeWire and blindly exposes the bare PulseAudio socket to the container (behaves
	// like DirectPulse). This socket is backed by the pipewire-pulse compatibility daemon,
	// which obtains client pid via the SO_PEERCRED option. The PipeWire daemon, pipewire-pulse
	// daemon and the session manager daemon then separately performs the /.flatpak-info hack
	// described in https://git.gensokyo.uk/security/hakurei/issues/21. Under such use case,
	// since the client has no direct access to PipeWire, insecure parts of the protocol are
	// obscured by pipewire-pulse simply not implementing them, and thus hiding the flaws
	// described above.
	//
	// Hakurei does not rely on the /.flatpak-info hack. Instead, a socket is sets up via
	// SecurityContext. A pipewire-pulse server connected through it achieves the same
	// permissions as flatpak does via the /.flatpak-info hack and is maintained for the
	// life of the container.
	//
	// This option is unsupported and enables a denial-of-service attack as the sandboxed
	// client is able to destroy any client object and thus disconnecting them from PipeWire,
	// or destroy the SecurityContext object preventing any further container creation.
	// Do not set this to true, it is insecure under any configuration.
	DirectPipeWire bool `json:"direct_pipewire,omitempty"`
	// Direct access to PulseAudio socket, no attempt is made to establish pipewire-pulse
	// server via a PipeWire socket with a SecurityContext attached and the bare socket
	// is made available to the container.
	//
	// This option is unsupported and enables arbitrary code execution as the PulseAudio
	// server. Do not set this to true, it is insecure under any configuration.
	DirectPulse bool `json:"direct_pulse,omitempty"`

	// Extra acl updates to perform before setuid.
	ExtraPerms []ExtraPermConfig `json:"extra_perms,omitempty"`

	// Numerical application id, passed to hsu, used to derive init user namespace credentials.
	Identity int `json:"identity"`
	// Init user namespace supplementary groups inherited by all container processes.
	Groups []string `json:"groups"`

	// High level configuration applied to the underlying [container].
	Container *ContainerConfig `json:"container"`
}

var (
	// ErrConfigNull is returned by [Config.Validate] for an invalid configuration that contains a null value for any
	// field that must not be null.
	ErrConfigNull = errors.New("unexpected null in config")

	// ErrIdentityBounds is returned by [Config.Validate] for an out of bounds [Config.Identity] value.
	ErrIdentityBounds = errors.New("identity out of bounds")

	// ErrEnviron is returned by [Config.Validate] if an environment variable name contains '=' or NUL.
	ErrEnviron = errors.New("invalid environment variable name")

	// ErrInsecure is returned by [Config.Validate] if the configuration is considered insecure.
	ErrInsecure = errors.New("configuration is insecure")
)

// Validate checks [Config] and returns [AppError] if an invalid value is encountered.
func (config *Config) Validate() error {
	if config == nil {
		return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrConfigNull,
			Msg: "invalid configuration"}
	}

	// this is checked again in hsu
	if config.Identity < IdentityStart || config.Identity > IdentityEnd {
		return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrIdentityBounds,
			Msg: "identity " + strconv.Itoa(config.Identity) + " out of range"}
	}

	if err := config.SessionBus.CheckInterfaces("session"); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err := config.SystemBus.CheckInterfaces("system"); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	if config.Container == nil {
		return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrConfigNull,
			Msg: "configuration missing container state"}
	}
	if config.Container.Home == nil {
		return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrConfigNull,
			Msg: "container configuration missing path to home directory"}
	}
	if config.Container.Shell == nil {
		return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrConfigNull,
			Msg: "container configuration missing path to shell"}
	}
	if config.Container.Path == nil {
		return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrConfigNull,
			Msg: "container configuration missing path to initial program"}
	}

	for key := range config.Container.Env {
		if strings.IndexByte(key, '=') != -1 || strings.IndexByte(key, 0) != -1 {
			return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrEnviron,
				Msg: "invalid environment variable " + strconv.Quote(key)}
		}
	}

	if et := config.Enablements.Unwrap(); !config.DirectPulse && et&EPulse != 0 {
		return &AppError{Step: "validate configuration", Err: ErrInsecure,
			Msg: "enablement PulseAudio is insecure and no longer supported"}
	}

	return nil
}

// ExtraPermConfig describes an acl update to perform before setuid.
type ExtraPermConfig struct {
	// Whether to create Path as a directory if it does not exist.
	Ensure bool `json:"ensure,omitempty"`
	// Pathname to act on.
	Path *check.Absolute `json:"path"`
	// Whether to set ACL_READ for the target user.
	Read bool `json:"r,omitempty"`
	// Whether to set ACL_WRITE for the target user.
	Write bool `json:"w,omitempty"`
	// Whether to set ACL_EXECUTE for the target user.
	Execute bool `json:"x,omitempty"`
}

// String returns a checked string representation of [ExtraPermConfig].
func (e *ExtraPermConfig) String() string {
	if e == nil || e.Path == nil {
		return "<invalid>"
	}
	buf := make([]byte, 0, 5+len(e.Path.String()))
	buf = append(buf, '-', '-', '-')
	if e.Ensure {
		buf = append(buf, '+')
	}
	buf = append(buf, ':')
	buf = append(buf, []byte(e.Path.String())...)
	if e.Read {
		buf[0] = 'r'
	}
	if e.Write {
		buf[1] = 'w'
	}
	if e.Execute {
		buf[2] = 'x'
	}
	return string(buf)
}