hakurei/sandbox/seccomp/libseccomp-helper.c
Ophestra 1a8840bebc
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sandbox/seccomp: resolve rules natively
This enables loading syscall filter policies from external cross-platform config files.

This also removes a significant amount of C code.

Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
2025-07-01 22:11:32 +09:00

131 lines
3.7 KiB
C

#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE /* CLONE_NEWUSER */
#endif
#include "libseccomp-helper.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define LEN(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
int32_t hakurei_prepare_filter(int *ret_p, int fd, uint32_t arch,
uint32_t multiarch,
struct hakurei_syscall_rule *rules,
size_t rules_sz, hakurei_prepare_flag flags) {
int i;
int last_allowed_family;
int disallowed;
struct hakurei_syscall_rule *rule;
int32_t res = 0; /* refer to resPrefix for message */
/* Blocklist all but unix, inet, inet6 and netlink */
struct {
int family;
hakurei_prepare_flag flags_mask;
} socket_family_allowlist[] = {
/* NOTE: Keep in numerical order */
{AF_UNSPEC, 0},
{AF_LOCAL, 0},
{AF_INET, 0},
{AF_INET6, 0},
{AF_NETLINK, 0},
{AF_CAN, HAKUREI_PREPARE_CAN},
{AF_BLUETOOTH, HAKUREI_PREPARE_BLUETOOTH},
};
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (ctx == NULL) {
res = 1;
goto out;
} else
errno = 0;
/* We only really need to handle arches on multiarch systems.
* If only one arch is supported the default is fine */
if (arch != 0) {
/* This *adds* the target arch, instead of replacing the
* native one. This is not ideal, because we'd like to only
* allow the target arch, but we can't really disallow the
* native arch at this point, because then bubblewrap
* couldn't continue running. */
*ret_p = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, arch);
if (*ret_p < 0 && *ret_p != -EEXIST) {
res = 2;
goto out;
}
if (flags & HAKUREI_PREPARE_MULTIARCH && multiarch != 0) {
*ret_p = seccomp_arch_add(ctx, multiarch);
if (*ret_p < 0 && *ret_p != -EEXIST) {
res = 3;
goto out;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < rules_sz; i++) {
rule = &rules[i];
assert(rule->m_errno == EPERM || rule->m_errno == ENOSYS);
if (rule->arg)
*ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(rule->m_errno),
rule->syscall, 1, *rule->arg);
else
*ret_p = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(rule->m_errno),
rule->syscall, 0);
if (*ret_p == -EFAULT) {
res = 4;
goto out;
} else if (*ret_p < 0) {
res = 5;
goto out;
}
}
/* Socket filtering doesn't work on e.g. i386, so ignore failures here
* However, we need to user seccomp_rule_add_exact to avoid libseccomp doing
* something else: https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/8 */
last_allowed_family = -1;
for (i = 0; i < LEN(socket_family_allowlist); i++) {
if (socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask != 0 &&
(socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask & flags) !=
socket_family_allowlist[i].flags_mask)
continue;
for (disallowed = last_allowed_family + 1;
disallowed < socket_family_allowlist[i].family; disallowed++) {
/* Blocklist the in-between valid families */
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT),
SCMP_SYS(socket), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, disallowed));
}
last_allowed_family = socket_family_allowlist[i].family;
}
/* Blocklist the rest */
seccomp_rule_add_exact(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GE, last_allowed_family + 1));
if (fd < 0) {
*ret_p = seccomp_load(ctx);
if (*ret_p != 0) {
res = 7;
goto out;
}
} else {
*ret_p = seccomp_export_bpf(ctx, fd);
if (*ret_p != 0) {
res = 6;
goto out;
}
}
out:
if (ctx)
seccomp_release(ctx);
return res;
}