Ophestra
e94acc424c
All checks were successful
Test / Create distribution (push) Successful in 32s
Test / Sandbox (push) Successful in 2m19s
Test / Hakurei (push) Successful in 3m9s
Test / Hpkg (push) Successful in 3m53s
Test / Sandbox (race detector) (push) Successful in 4m2s
Test / Hakurei (race detector) (push) Successful in 4m43s
Test / Flake checks (push) Successful in 1m23s
This package will also hold syscall lookup tables for seccomp. Signed-off-by: Ophestra <cat@gensokyo.uk>
217 lines
7.9 KiB
Go
217 lines
7.9 KiB
Go
package seccomp
|
|
|
|
/* flatpak commit 4c3bf179e2e4a2a298cd1db1d045adaf3f564532 */
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
. "syscall"
|
|
|
|
"hakurei.app/container/comp"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func Preset(presets comp.FilterPreset, flags ExportFlag) (rules []NativeRule) {
|
|
allowedPersonality := PersonaLinux
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetLinux32 != 0 {
|
|
allowedPersonality = PersonaLinux32
|
|
}
|
|
presetDevelFinal := presetDevel(ScmpDatum(allowedPersonality))
|
|
|
|
l := len(presetCommon)
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyNS != 0 {
|
|
l += len(presetNamespace)
|
|
}
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyTTY != 0 {
|
|
l += len(presetTTY)
|
|
}
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyDevel != 0 {
|
|
l += len(presetDevelFinal)
|
|
}
|
|
if flags&AllowMultiarch == 0 {
|
|
l += len(presetEmu)
|
|
}
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetExt != 0 {
|
|
l += len(presetCommonExt)
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyNS != 0 {
|
|
l += len(presetNamespaceExt)
|
|
}
|
|
if flags&AllowMultiarch == 0 {
|
|
l += len(presetEmuExt)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rules = make([]NativeRule, 0, l)
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetCommon...)
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyNS != 0 {
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetNamespace...)
|
|
}
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyTTY != 0 {
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetTTY...)
|
|
}
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyDevel != 0 {
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetDevelFinal...)
|
|
}
|
|
if flags&AllowMultiarch == 0 {
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetEmu...)
|
|
}
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetExt != 0 {
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetCommonExt...)
|
|
if presets&comp.PresetDenyNS != 0 {
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetNamespaceExt...)
|
|
}
|
|
if flags&AllowMultiarch == 0 {
|
|
rules = append(rules, presetEmuExt...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
presetCommon = []NativeRule{
|
|
/* Block dmesg */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SYSLOG), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
/* Useless old syscall */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_USELIB), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
/* Don't allow disabling accounting */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_ACCT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
/* Don't allow reading current quota use */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_QUOTACTL), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
|
|
/* Don't allow access to the kernel keyring */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_ADD_KEY), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_KEYCTL), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_REQUEST_KEY), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
|
|
/* Scary VM/NUMA ops */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_MOVE_PAGES), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_MBIND), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_GET_MEMPOLICY), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SET_MEMPOLICY), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_MIGRATE_PAGES), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* hakurei: project-specific extensions */
|
|
presetCommonExt = []NativeRule{
|
|
/* system calls for changing the system clock */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_ADJTIMEX), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CLOCK_ADJTIME), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CLOCK_ADJTIME64), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CLOCK_SETTIME), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CLOCK_SETTIME64), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETTIMEOFDAY), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
|
|
/* loading and unloading of kernel modules */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_DELETE_MODULE), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FINIT_MODULE), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_INIT_MODULE), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
|
|
/* system calls for rebooting and reboot preparation */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_KEXEC_FILE_LOAD), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_KEXEC_LOAD), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_REBOOT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
|
|
/* system calls for enabling/disabling swap devices */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SWAPOFF), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SWAPON), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
presetNamespace = []NativeRule{
|
|
/* Don't allow subnamespace setups: */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_UNSHARE), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETNS), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_MOUNT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_UMOUNT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_UMOUNT2), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_PIVOT_ROOT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CHROOT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CLONE), ScmpErrno(EPERM),
|
|
&ScmpArgCmp{cloneArg, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUSER}},
|
|
|
|
/* seccomp can't look into clone3()'s struct clone_args to check whether
|
|
* the flags are OK, so we have no choice but to block clone3().
|
|
* Return ENOSYS so user-space will fall back to clone().
|
|
* (CVE-2021-41133; see also https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/9f6b562d)
|
|
*/
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CLONE3), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
|
|
/* New mount manipulation APIs can also change our VFS. There's no
|
|
* legitimate reason to do these in the sandbox, so block all of them
|
|
* rather than thinking about which ones might be dangerous.
|
|
* (CVE-2021-41133) */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_OPEN_TREE), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_MOVE_MOUNT), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FSOPEN), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FSCONFIG), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FSMOUNT), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FSPICK), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_MOUNT_SETATTR), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* hakurei: project-specific extensions */
|
|
presetNamespaceExt = []NativeRule{
|
|
/* changing file ownership */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CHOWN), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_CHOWN32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FCHOWN), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FCHOWN32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_FCHOWNAT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_LCHOWN), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_LCHOWN32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
|
|
/* system calls for changing user ID and group ID credentials */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETGID), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETGID32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETGROUPS), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETGROUPS32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETREGID), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETREGID32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETRESGID), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETRESGID32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETRESUID), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETRESUID32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETREUID), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETREUID32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETUID), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SETUID32), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
presetTTY = []NativeRule{
|
|
/* Don't allow faking input to the controlling tty (CVE-2017-5226) */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_IOCTL), ScmpErrno(EPERM),
|
|
&ScmpArgCmp{1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFF, TIOCSTI}},
|
|
/* In the unlikely event that the controlling tty is a Linux virtual
|
|
* console (/dev/tty2 or similar), copy/paste operations have an effect
|
|
* similar to TIOCSTI (CVE-2023-28100) */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_IOCTL), ScmpErrno(EPERM),
|
|
&ScmpArgCmp{1, SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, 0xFFFFFFFF, TIOCLINUX}},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
presetEmu = []NativeRule{
|
|
/* modify_ldt is a historic source of interesting information leaks,
|
|
* so it's disabled as a hardening measure.
|
|
* However, it is required to run old 16-bit applications
|
|
* as well as some Wine patches, so it's allowed in multiarch. */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_MODIFY_LDT), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* hakurei: project-specific extensions */
|
|
presetEmuExt = []NativeRule{
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SUBPAGE_PROT), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_SWITCH_ENDIAN), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_VM86), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_VM86OLD), ScmpErrno(ENOSYS), nil},
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func presetDevel(allowedPersonality ScmpDatum) []NativeRule {
|
|
return []NativeRule{
|
|
/* Profiling operations; we expect these to be done by tools from outside
|
|
* the sandbox. In particular perf has been the source of many CVEs. */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_PERF_EVENT_OPEN), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
/* Don't allow you to switch to bsd emulation or whatnot */
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_PERSONALITY), ScmpErrno(EPERM),
|
|
&ScmpArgCmp{0, SCMP_CMP_NE, allowedPersonality, 0}},
|
|
|
|
{ScmpSyscall(SYS_PTRACE), ScmpErrno(EPERM), nil},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|