divide up features page into sections
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Micay
parent
bcca526cf5
commit
5dfb353e77
@ -60,135 +60,147 @@
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AOSP and the hardware are not covered here. Documentation on that will be gradually
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added elsewhere on our site.</p>
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<p>Partial list of GrapheneOS features beyond what AOSP 11 provides:</p>
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<section id="grapheneos">
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<h2><a href="#grapheneos">GrapheneOS</a></h2>
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<ul>
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<li>Hardened app runtime</li>
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<li>Stronger app sandbox</li>
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<li>Hardened libc providing defenses against the most common classes of vulnerabilities (memory
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corruption)</li>
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<li>Our own <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc">hardened malloc (memory allocator)</a>
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leveraging modern hardware capabilities to provide substantial defenses against
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the most common classes of vulnerabilities (heap memory corruption) along with
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reducing the lifetime of sensitive data in memory. The
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<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc/blob/master/README.md">hardened_malloc
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README</a> has extensive documentation on it. The hardened_malloc project is
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portable to other Linux-based operating systems and is being adopted by other
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security-focused operating systems like Whonix. Our allocator also heavily influenced the
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design of the <a href="https://www.openwall.com/lists/musl/2020/05/13/1">next-generation
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musl malloc implementation</a> which offers substantially better security than musl's
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previous malloc while still having minimal memory usage and code size.</li>
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<li>Hardened compiler toolchain</li>
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<li>Hardened kernel</li>
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<li>Prevention of dynamic native code execution in-memory or via the filesystem
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for the base OS without going via the package manager, etc.</li>
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<li>Filesystem access hardening</li>
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<li>Enhanced verified boot with better security properties and reduced attack surface</li>
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<li>Enhanced hardware-based attestation with more precise version information</li>
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<li>Eliminates remaining holes for apps to access hardware-based identifiers</li>
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<li>Greatly reduced remote, local and proximity-based attack surface by stripping out unnecessary
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code, making more features optional and disabling optional features by default (NFC, Bluetooth, etc.) or when the
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screen is locked (connecting new USB peripherals, camera access)</li>
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<li>Low-level improvements to the filesystem-based full disk encryption used on
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modern Android</li>
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<li>Support for logging out of user profiles without needing a device manager: makes them inactive so that they can't continue running code while using another profile and purges the disk encryption keys (which are per-profile) from memory and hardware registers</li>
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<li>Support longer passwords by default without a device manager</li>
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<li>Stricter implementation of the optional fingerprint unlock feature permitting
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only 5 attempts rather than 20 before permanent lockout (our recommendation is
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still keeping sensitive data in user profiles without fingerprint unlock)</li>
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<li>PIN scrambling option</li>
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<li><a href="/usage#lte-only-mode">LTE-only mode</a> to reduce cellular radio attack surface by disabling enormous amounts of legacy
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code</li>
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<li><a href="/usage#wifi-privacy-associated">Default enabled per-connection MAC randomization</a>
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as an improvement over Android's default per-network MAC randomization reusing
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the same MAC address until the DHCP lease with that network expires (can still
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use the standard implementation or fully disable it)</li>
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<li>Vanadium: hardened WebView and default browser - the WebView is what most
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other apps use to handle web content, so you benefit from Vanadium in many apps
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even if you choose another browser</li>
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<li>Hardware-based security verification and monitoring: the
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<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases">Auditor app</a> app and
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<a href="https://attestation.app/">attestation service</a> provide strong
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hardware-based verification of the authenticity and integrity of the
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firmware/software on the device. A strong pairing-based approach is used which
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also provides verification of the device's identity based on the hardware backed
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key generated for each pairing. Software-based checks are layered on top with
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trust securely chained from the hardware. For more details, see the
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<a href="https://attestation.app/about">about page</a>
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and <a href="https://attestation.app/tutorial">tutorial</a>.</li>
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<li><a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer">PDF Viewer</a>: sandboxed,
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hardened PDF viewer using HiDPI rendering with pinch to zoom, text selection,
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etc.</li>
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<li>Encrypted backups via integration of the
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<a href="https://github.com/seedvault-app/seedvault">Seedvault app</a> with
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support for local backups and any cloud storage provider with a storage provider
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app</li>
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<li><a href="/usage#exec-spawning">Secure application spawning system</a> avoiding
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sharing address space layout and other secrets across applications</li>
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<li>Network permission toggle disallowing both direct and indirect network access,
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superior to a purely firewall-based implementation only disallowing direct
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access to the network without covering inter-process communication (enabled by
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default for compatibility)</li>
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<li>Sensors permission toggle: disallow access to all other sensors not covered by
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existing Android permissions (enabled by default for compatibility)</li>
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<li>Authenticated encryption for network time updates via a first party server to
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prevent attackers from changing the time and enabling attacks based on bypassing
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certificate / key expiry, etc.</li>
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<li>Proper support for disabling network time updates rather than just not using
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the results</li>
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<li>Connectivity checks via a first party server with the option to revert to the
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standard checks</li>
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<li>Hardened local build / signing infrastructure</li>
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<li><a href="/usage#updates">Seamless automatic OS update system</a> that just
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works and stays out of the way in the background without disrupting device
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usage, with full support for the standard automatic rollback if the first boot
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of the updated OS fails</li> <li>Require unlocking to access sensitive function
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via quick tiles</li>
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<li>Minor changes to default settings to prefer privacy over small conveniences:
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personalized keyboard suggestions based on gathering input history are disabled by
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default, sensitive notifications are hidden on the lockscreen by default and
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passwords are hidden during entry by default</li>
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</ul>
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<p>Partial list of GrapheneOS features beyond what AOSP 11 provides:</p>
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<p>Infrastructure features:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>Hardened app runtime</li>
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<li>Stronger app sandbox</li>
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<li>Hardened libc providing defenses against the most common classes of vulnerabilities (memory
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corruption)</li>
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<li>Our own <a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc">hardened malloc (memory allocator)</a>
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leveraging modern hardware capabilities to provide substantial defenses against
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the most common classes of vulnerabilities (heap memory corruption) along with
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reducing the lifetime of sensitive data in memory. The
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<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc/blob/master/README.md">hardened_malloc
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README</a> has extensive documentation on it. The hardened_malloc project is
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portable to other Linux-based operating systems and is being adopted by other
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security-focused operating systems like Whonix. Our allocator also heavily influenced the
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design of the <a href="https://www.openwall.com/lists/musl/2020/05/13/1">next-generation
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musl malloc implementation</a> which offers substantially better security than musl's
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previous malloc while still having minimal memory usage and code size.</li>
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<li>Hardened compiler toolchain</li>
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<li>Hardened kernel</li>
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<li>Prevention of dynamic native code execution in-memory or via the filesystem
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for the base OS without going via the package manager, etc.</li>
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<li>Filesystem access hardening</li>
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<li>Enhanced verified boot with better security properties and reduced attack surface</li>
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<li>Enhanced hardware-based attestation with more precise version information</li>
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<li>Eliminates remaining holes for apps to access hardware-based identifiers</li>
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<li>Greatly reduced remote, local and proximity-based attack surface by stripping out unnecessary
|
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code, making more features optional and disabling optional features by default (NFC, Bluetooth, etc.) or when the
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screen is locked (connecting new USB peripherals, camera access)</li>
|
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<li>Low-level improvements to the filesystem-based full disk encryption used on
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modern Android</li>
|
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<li>Support for logging out of user profiles without needing a device manager: makes them inactive so that they can't continue running code while using another profile and purges the disk encryption keys (which are per-profile) from memory and hardware registers</li>
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<li>Support longer passwords by default without a device manager</li>
|
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<li>Stricter implementation of the optional fingerprint unlock feature permitting
|
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only 5 attempts rather than 20 before permanent lockout (our recommendation is
|
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still keeping sensitive data in user profiles without fingerprint unlock)</li>
|
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<li>PIN scrambling option</li>
|
||||
<li><a href="/usage#lte-only-mode">LTE-only mode</a> to reduce cellular radio attack surface by disabling enormous amounts of legacy
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code</li>
|
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<li><a href="/usage#wifi-privacy-associated">Default enabled per-connection MAC randomization</a>
|
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as an improvement over Android's default per-network MAC randomization reusing
|
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the same MAC address until the DHCP lease with that network expires (can still
|
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use the standard implementation or fully disable it)</li>
|
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<li>Vanadium: hardened WebView and default browser - the WebView is what most
|
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other apps use to handle web content, so you benefit from Vanadium in many apps
|
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even if you choose another browser</li>
|
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<li>Hardware-based security verification and monitoring: the
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<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases">Auditor app</a> app and
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<a href="https://attestation.app/">attestation service</a> provide strong
|
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hardware-based verification of the authenticity and integrity of the
|
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firmware/software on the device. A strong pairing-based approach is used which
|
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also provides verification of the device's identity based on the hardware backed
|
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key generated for each pairing. Software-based checks are layered on top with
|
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trust securely chained from the hardware. For more details, see the
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<a href="https://attestation.app/about">about page</a>
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and <a href="https://attestation.app/tutorial">tutorial</a>.</li>
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<li><a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer">PDF Viewer</a>: sandboxed,
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hardened PDF viewer using HiDPI rendering with pinch to zoom, text selection,
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etc.</li>
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<li>Encrypted backups via integration of the
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<a href="https://github.com/seedvault-app/seedvault">Seedvault app</a> with
|
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support for local backups and any cloud storage provider with a storage provider
|
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app</li>
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<li><a href="/usage#exec-spawning">Secure application spawning system</a> avoiding
|
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sharing address space layout and other secrets across applications</li>
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<li>Network permission toggle disallowing both direct and indirect network access,
|
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superior to a purely firewall-based implementation only disallowing direct
|
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access to the network without covering inter-process communication (enabled by
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default for compatibility)</li>
|
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<li>Sensors permission toggle: disallow access to all other sensors not covered by
|
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existing Android permissions (enabled by default for compatibility)</li>
|
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<li>Authenticated encryption for network time updates via a first party server to
|
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prevent attackers from changing the time and enabling attacks based on bypassing
|
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certificate / key expiry, etc.</li>
|
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<li>Proper support for disabling network time updates rather than just not using
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the results</li>
|
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<li>Connectivity checks via a first party server with the option to revert to the
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standard checks</li>
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<li>Hardened local build / signing infrastructure</li>
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<li><a href="/usage#updates">Seamless automatic OS update system</a> that just
|
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works and stays out of the way in the background without disrupting device
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usage, with full support for the standard automatic rollback if the first boot
|
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of the updated OS fails</li> <li>Require unlocking to access sensitive function
|
||||
via quick tiles</li>
|
||||
<li>Minor changes to default settings to prefer privacy over small conveniences:
|
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personalized keyboard suggestions based on gathering input history are disabled by
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default, sensitive notifications are hidden on the lockscreen by default and
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passwords are hidden during entry by default</li>
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</ul>
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</section>
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<ul>
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<li>Strict privacy and security practices for our infrastructure</li>
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<li>Unnecessary logging is avoided and logs are automatically purged after 10 days</li>
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<li>Services hosted on OVH without involving any additional parties for CDNs,
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mirrors or other services - we don't outsource to others</li>
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<li>Our services are built with open technology stacks to avoid being locked in to
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any particular hosting provider or vendor</li>
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<li>Open documentation on our infrastructure including listing out all of our
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services, guides on making similar setups, published configurations for each
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of our web services, etc.</li>
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<li>No proprietary services</li>
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<li>Authenticated encryption for all of our services</li>
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<li>Strong cipher configurations for all of our services (SSH, TLS, etc.)</li>
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<li>DNSSEC for all our domains</li>
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<li>SSHFP across all domains for pinning SSH keys</li>
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<li>DANE TLSA records for pinning keys for all our TLS services (unfortunately only
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used by a subset of other mail services in practice, and not yet web
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browsers)</li>
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<li>Static key pinning for our services in apps like Auditor</li>
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<li>No cookies or similar client-side state for anything other than login sessions,
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which are set up via SameSite=strict cookies and have server-side session tracking
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with the ability to log out of other sessions</li>
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<li>scrypt-based password hashing (likely Argon2 when the available implementations
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are more mature)</li>
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</ul>
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<section id="services">
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<h2><a href="#services">Services</a></h2>
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<p>Beyond the technical features of the OS:</p>
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<p>Service infrastructure features:</p>
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<ul>
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<li>Collaborative, open source project with a very active community and contributors</li>
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<li>Can make your own builds and make desired changes, so you aren't stuck with
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the decisions made by the upstream project</li>
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<li>Non-profit project avoiding conflicts of interest by keeping commercialization
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||||
at a distance. Companies support the project rather than the project serving the
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needs of any particular company</li>
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<li><a href="/faq#privacy-policy">Strong privacy policies</a></li>
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</ul>
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<ul>
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<li>Strict privacy and security practices for our infrastructure</li>
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||||
<li>Unnecessary logging is avoided and logs are automatically purged after 10 days</li>
|
||||
<li>Services hosted on OVH without involving any additional parties for CDNs,
|
||||
mirrors or other services - we don't outsource to others</li>
|
||||
<li>Our services are built with open technology stacks to avoid being locked in to
|
||||
any particular hosting provider or vendor</li>
|
||||
<li>Open documentation on our infrastructure including listing out all of our
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||||
services, guides on making similar setups, published configurations for each
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of our web services, etc.</li>
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<li>No proprietary services</li>
|
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<li>Authenticated encryption for all of our services</li>
|
||||
<li>Strong cipher configurations for all of our services (SSH, TLS, etc.)</li>
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||||
<li>DNSSEC for all our domains</li>
|
||||
<li>SSHFP across all domains for pinning SSH keys</li>
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||||
<li>DANE TLSA records for pinning keys for all our TLS services (unfortunately only
|
||||
used by a subset of other mail services in practice, and not yet web
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||||
browsers)</li>
|
||||
<li>Static key pinning for our services in apps like Auditor</li>
|
||||
<li>No cookies or similar client-side state for anything other than login sessions,
|
||||
which are set up via SameSite=strict cookies and have server-side session tracking
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||||
with the ability to log out of other sessions</li>
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<li>scrypt-based password hashing (likely Argon2 when the available implementations
|
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are more mature)</li>
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</ul>
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</section>
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<section id="project">
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<h2><a href="#project">Project</a></h2>
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<p>Beyond the technical features of the OS:</p>
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||||
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<ul>
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<li>Collaborative, open source project with a very active community and contributors</li>
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<li>Can make your own builds and make desired changes, so you aren't stuck with
|
||||
the decisions made by the upstream project</li>
|
||||
<li>Non-profit project avoiding conflicts of interest by keeping commercialization
|
||||
at a distance. Companies support the project rather than the project serving the
|
||||
needs of any particular company</li>
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<li><a href="/faq#privacy-policy">Strong privacy policies</a></li>
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</ul>
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</section>
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</main>
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<footer>
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<a href="/"><img src="/logo.png" width="512" height="512" alt=""/>GrapheneOS</a>
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