reorder FAQ
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@ -62,10 +62,10 @@
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#hardware-identifiers">Can apps access hardware
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identifiers?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and
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bundled apps make by default?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular
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tracking and silent SMS?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#default-connections">Which connections do the OS and
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bundled apps make by default?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#custom-dns">How do I use a custom DNS server?</a></li>
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<li><a href="#private-dns-ip">Why does Private DNS not accept IP
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@ -255,6 +255,44 @@
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<p>GrapheneOS only makes a small change to remove a legacy form of access to the
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serial number by legacy apps, which was still around for compatibility.</p>
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<h3 id="cellular-tracking">
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<a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and
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silent SMS?</a>
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</h3>
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<p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak
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or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere
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providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One
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of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills
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based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p>
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<p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive
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capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular
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network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the
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device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as
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Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on
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the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the
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cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular
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radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p>
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<p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along
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the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and
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information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided
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as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security
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against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing
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with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be
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foolish and doomed to failure.</p>
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<p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell
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carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send
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them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether
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or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a
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useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving
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unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger
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alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless,
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sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices
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connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p>
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<h3 id="default-connections">
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<a href="#default-connections">What kind of connections do the OS and bundled apps
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make by default?</a>
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@ -338,44 +376,6 @@
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</li>
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</ul>
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<h3 id="cellular-tracking">
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<a href="#cellular-tracking">What does GrapheneOS do about cellular tracking and
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silent SMS?</a>
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</h3>
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<p>GrapheneOS always considers the network to be hostile and does not implement weak
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or useless mitigations. Therefore, it does not have the assorted gimmicks seen elsewhere
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providing privacy/security theatre to make users feel better about these issues. One
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of the core tenets of GrapheneOS is being honest with users and avoiding scams/frills
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based around marketing rather than real world privacy/security threat models.</p>
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<p>Activating airplane mode will fully disable the cellular radio transmit and receive
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capabilities, which will prevent your phone from being reached from the cellular
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network and stop your carrier (and anyone impersonating them to you) from tracking the
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device via the cellular radio. The baseband implements other functionality such as
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Wi-Fi and GPS functionality, but each of these components is separately sandboxed on
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the baseband and independent of each other. Enabling airplane mode disables the
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cellular radio, but Wi-Fi can be re-enabled and used without activating the cellular
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radio again. This allows using the device as a Wi-Fi only device.</p>
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<p>Even if interception of the connection or some other man-in-the-middle attack along
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the network is not currently occurring, the network is still untrustworthy and
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information should not be sent unencrypted. Legacy calls and texts should be avoided
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as they're not secure and trust the carrier / network along with having weak security
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against other parties. Trying to detect some forms of interception rather than dealing
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with the root of the problem (unencrypted communications / data transfer) would be
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foolish and doomed to failure.</p>
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<p>Receiving a silent SMS is not a good indicator of being targeted by your cell
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carrier, police or government because <em>anyone on the cell network can send
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them</em> including yourself. Cellular triangulation will happen regardless of whether
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or not SMS texts are being sent or received by the phone. Even if an SMS did serve a
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useful purpose for tracking, a silent SMS would be little different than receiving
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unsolicited spam. In fact, sending spam would be stealthier since it wouldn't trigger
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alerts for silent SMS but rather would be ignored with the rest of the spam. Regardless,
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sending texts or other data is not required or particularly useful to track devices
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connected to a network for an adversary with the appropriate access.</p>
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<h3 id="default-dns">
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<a href="#default-dns">Which DNS servers are used by default?</a>
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</h3>
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